Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (Illinois)

First, that heat waves kill more people annualy than all other types of natural disasters combined. Yet they receive little public attention mostly because they fail to generate the massive property damage and fantastic images produced by other weather-related disasters.

Second, most of the people that died were the elderly and poor, who died at home, with their windows often sealed or even nailed shut to prevent rampant crime in their areas. They had no air conditioning because they could not afford it, and little or any access to any social help because of their economic situation.

The author also looks into how the city of Chicago didn't come to grips with what had happened until the heat wave was well over, and that because of the social structure where the affluent have ample protection from such massive natural disasters, the elderly, infirm and poor will likely remain having none. And while dealing with the aftermath is much more costly, governments choose not to prepare for them with social programs which are often viewed as liberal pork or government waste.

A fascinating, well written book. It also contains many images, some of which appear is if taken from somewhere like Somalia. Eric Klinenberg is an sociology professor at Northwestern University.


Killer Heat, Killer Neglect   November 1, 2002
R. Hardy (Columbus, Mississippi USA)
16 out of 17 found this review helpful

What weather phenomenon kills the most people in America? Hurricanes? Tornadoes? Floods? Add those up and they will still not total the deaths attributed to the real killer: heat waves. The other phenomena yield good pictures, and that is one reason you don't hear much about heat deaths. But according to Eric Klinenberg, an assistant professor of sociology at New York University, there is another, more subtle reason. Victims of a heat wave "are primarily social outcasts - the elderly, the poor, and the isolated - from whom we customarily turn away." In _Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago_ (University of Chicago Press), Klinenberg has looked at the week-long heat wave of July 1995, which killed over 700 people. (Another comparison: the famous Chicago fire of 1871 killed about three hundred.) In Chicago, the heat hit up to 106 degrees, with a heat index over 120. Cars broke down in the streets, and bridges, rails, and roads buckled. Even with the windows open, brick homes could heat up to 120 degrees. The heat killed, but it did not just kill randomly. In clear, objective, but often biting pages, Klinenberg shows the patterns of urban life that brought death to certain regions and certain social groups.

One group was the elderly, clearly disproportionately killed by the heat. This might be attributed simply to their bodies having fewer physiological resources to protect them. Indeed, the government of Chicago tried to explain the deaths of elders this way; the heat only culled those who were going to be dying soon anyway. There is no medical evidence that this was the case; they simply were unconnected with society, and when they died alone in their rooms, it was long before absences were noticed. Klinenberg argues forcefully that the Chicago government, at different levels, did not respond to the disaster as it would have a big fire or a train wreck. When deaths mounted, Mayor Daley was able to frame the issue as a "debate" about the rising number of deaths, when there was no scientific controversy about the matter. Human Services Commissioner Daniel Alvarez did a classic move of blaming the victim, saying, "We're talking about people who die because they neglect themselves. We did everything possible. But some people didn't want to even open their doors to us." The media also come in for criticism. They took up the artificial controversy generated by the mayor about whether the heat deaths were "real" or not. There was little analysis about which regions were being the most affected and why, and the official city version of how little could be done against an act of God was repeatedly parroted. By the time the reporters did a comprehensive story, it was "old news" and didn't run.

No one was more forgotten than forty-one victims whose bodies no one claimed or cared about. They languished in the county morgue until August, when they were buried in a huge common trench in a potter's field. Visiting the site in preparation for the book, Klinenberg learned that a few reporters had come now and then to see it, but no Chicagoans and no family members. Social and governmental forces can't control the heat, he reminds us, but they can make deaths easy to overlook and forget. His book is a pointed effort to keep that from happening.


Brillant   December 23, 2002
11 out of 12 found this review helpful

Dr. Klinenberg helps us as readers, citizens, and media-watchers reconceptualize heat waves as meterological disasters to social ones. He argues that such a reconceptualization allows us to understand that society is responsible and SHOULD be responsible for deaths. The brillant part of his book is that he does not pin the blame on any one person, one entity, or one organization. He shows how residents of neighborhoods, the spatial organizations of neighborhoods, politicians, local and national governments, the media, and even history play a role in why these deaths occurred and why the numbers were as significant as they are. Thus, we are all responsible!

The book looks at the phenomenon through more than just through the lens of statistics. His ethnographic work helps to look at the lives and qualitative nuances of the numbers. We hear the explanations and the critiques of the residents in the neighborhoods that were hit the hardest by the heat wave deaths. In addition, KLinenberg places their voices in conversation with reporters at the time, insiders of the Daly regime, public health officials, and even police officers. Therefore, we see the phenomenon from both the "official" and "unofficial" sources.

Anyone who is an activist, an academic, or a citizen of any American city should read this book. It will change your perspective on how urban areas really operate and SHOULD operate.

This book will make Dr. Klinenberg one of the foremost scholars of our time.


A tragedy on many levels   September 26, 2002
Jon Hunt (Old Greenwich, Ct. USA)
7 out of 7 found this review helpful

Eric Klinenberg's new book "Heat Wave" gives readers a tremendous insight into the Chicago heat wave of 1995. He approaches this tragedy from several fronts. He begins with an account of what happened during the several days of stifling heat and continues with a look at the social impact of living and dying alone, why certain neighborhoods lost more people than others and exposes a city ill-prepared to handle the mounting number of deaths. Klinenberg continues with an assault on the politics of Chicago, the response of the mayor and those around him and finishes with an adept look at the media's role and response to the deaths of over 700 people.

Although at times the author writes in a dry style he nonetheless portrays the Chicago heat wave as a catastrophic failure on many levels. Klinenberg gets down to the root of some socio-economic problems that beset Chicago and tells us the "whys" of their causes. Many things stood out as I read this important and often scary book, but one thing kept coming through....although heat waves are discriminating killers the solutions are there if right decisions are made at the right times, by governments and citizens alike.

A sad and ironic end to "Heat Wave" is told in the form of a senior editor at The Chicago Tribune who decided to relate this tragedy from both a human and social side. As Chicago cooled down his work went on. Unfortunately, only a small part of the story was ever printed as the paper decided that in the chill of November few readers would be interested in a story that had occurred during the blistering heat only a few months before.

I highly recommend this book. It is a service to help us understand what happened during July of that year. As the author points out, this could happen again.


Heat Wave: Social Isolation in Chicago   December 17, 2004
Env Soc (Madison, WI)
6 out of 13 found this review helpful


Over the summer of 1995, the area surrounding Chicago experienced extreme weather conditions that exposed people to a heat index reaching 126 degrees. The result was devastating to the community; a record number of deceased bodies were discovered as a direct result of heat exposure. The hot, humid air stalled over Chicago for one long week. When it was finally dissipated, it left residents of Chicago scared and confused. City streets had failed, electricity use had peaked and many lost power, and power grids had completely collapsed. It was a disaster that was heard around the world.
Between the dates of July 14 and July 20, 739 Chicago residents died from heat exposure. Every year, heat waves kill more people than all other natural disasters combined. However, they often are not heard of or spoken about. This is due to the fact that they are not physically damaging and that most heat wave victims are those who are socially isolated from their community. These groups often are composed primarily of elderly, poor, and those who choose to be isolated.
Heat waves directly are linked to these isolated groups, and until now, were not given any attention. Many are left vulnerable to disaster by not being connected into the community. Eric Klinenberg examines the tragedy that took place in Chicago and draws attention to the social, political, and institutional groups that all were involved in the situation. Heat Wave ties in isolation, inner-city neighborhoods, city services, and the news media as integral parts of the disaster that resulted from the heat wave in Chicago.
The first problem examined by Klinenberg was isolation. Many of the victims perished alone, without any companions nearby. Of the 739 bodies that were found dead, 170 of them went unclaimed showing the intensity of loneliness of those who perished. Klinenberg says that elderly isolation is the result of demographic shifts, crime, spatial transformation, and substance abuse problems. Adding to the problem, many of the elderly people lived in sealed rooms that did not allow for windows to be opened.
In the following chapter, Klinenberg examines the urban neighborhood and relates social structure to the isolation theory. He concludes that high poverty plays an important role when evaluating who is at risk for heat waves. Klinenberg emphasizes that these segregated areas do not allow people to establish social connections. Depleted buildings and violent crimes lead to further isolation. Once isolated, an event such as a heat wave disproportionately places certain individuals at an elevated risk to be affected by a disaster situation.
After examining the urban neighborhood, Klinenberg discovers that services provided by the city were not equally distributed. He concludes that support services should not be in the hands of government control. When you place the power into institutional organizations, services are distributed unequally and only offer aid to certain groups of people. Many people struggle to keep up with those benefiting and give up the chase for the services offered. Without adequate services, such as air-conditioning, people are placed at elevated risks from dying from a heat wave.
In his last analysis of the Chicago catastrophe, Klinenberg ties in the news media and their relevance to the heat wave in Chicago. The way the news is distributed is tied in to fit what specific people want to hear. For example, suburban residents were often not informed of the underlying problems related to the heat wave. Instead, the mayor spoke only of the event as being a natural disaster that could not have been avoided. Often, the people not affected by disasters are those that speak of the event. They are able to shape what is talked about and displace talk over the social problems related to the disaster.
Together, the factors discussed helped shape the events involved with the heat wave in Chicago. The socially isolated people seemed to be at the highest risk from the disaster. This incident represented how different groups and unrepresented and how certain people can control what is taken out of an event. Klinenberg closely examines the socially isolated to show that connections are important, and one is in threat without having connections.
However, Klinenberg fails to mention how certain people are motivated in different ways. He follows the thought of being isolated as a threat to one's health. Little talk is given to those who choose to be isolated. While some people feel as though they need people around them, others feel that isolation is the only way to break away from the mass crowd. Isolation does not result from one factor alone. People choose to remove themselves from society for many different reasons.
Also, Klinenberg fails to mention what is needed to change the current situations in Chicago. It is important to understand what happened in Chicago, but it would be hard to change the situation without a well-thought plan. Social and political institutions seem to be a starting point for most changes. We need to draw attention on how to change corrupt practice from political institutions. We must establish equal rights again and allow everyone to have access to city services. Without a plan, things will continue to go as they always have and attention on unequal practices will be displaced.
The disaster that occurred in Chicago was not the heat wave itself; it was the underlying social problems that stemmed from the heat wave. This put certain groups of people at elevated risks for heat related death. Attention must be given to heat wave disasters; they cause more deaths every year than all other natural disasters. The victims deserve equal rights and services. By doing so, life can be protected and shared among all groups of people.