Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy

I really enjoyed the new material and research that Hastings reveals as he tells the tale following D-Day. His treatment of the US Army is pretty balanced (some units fought well, while other "green units" had a tough time fighting the Germans), and I think he draws some interesting conclusions. His point that American Paratroopers and Ranger units were essential to the success of many battles highlights the success (and misuse at times) of these units.

Hastings goes into great detail about why the British/Canadian army struggled so much to take Caen. He has some critical words about Montgomery performance (he promised much, but deliverd little), but concludes overall that the British had a much more difficult fight against a stronger part of the German defense. I really enjoyed this section of the book because I have not read much about this part of the battle.

Hastings does talk at length about the mistake of letting the German Army escape at Falaise, although he concludes that the US Army would not have been able to close the gap with the units available. I do not totally agree with this conclusion, but it makes for interesting discussion.

I recommend this book for anyone interested in the ETO, especially Operation Overlord. If you are looking for a book specifically about D-Day, this is not the best one, in that it covers all of Operation Overlord, not just the invasion.


Overlord Review   December 5, 2001
Leon G. Galanos Jr. (APO, AA United States)
41 out of 46 found this review helpful

When I read history, I want to know both sides of the story. Reading one viewpoint is usually more about propaganda and less about history. Max Hastings satisfies this requirement. When digging into the facts of both the Western Allies (Americans, British, Canadians, Poles, and French) and the Germans and their less enthusiastic allies, Hastings describes bravery and honor on both sides. In addition, you get the warts that many historians gloss over (British reluctance to even embark on a mainland invasion, fairly equal amounts of shootings of POWs by both sides, and others). Most interesting is his indepth look at the contentious relationship between Montgomery and the Americans. Hastings points out that despite lackluster elan demonstrated by British and Canadian forces, it is true that Montgomery (and the USAAF) facilitated the final breakout of American forces (Cobra) by holding down the cream of German forces in Normandy, namely the Waffen-SS Panzer Corps, especially the very aggressive 12th SS Hitler Jugend (Youth) division. Hastings points out that with the exception of scattered German Parachute troops, American forces were tied down by mostly underequipped units made up of old survivors recovered from wounds on the eastern front, so-called volunteers from territories annexed by the Germans on the eastern front, and late-war scrapings of German manpower. Only later in the Normandy campaign did the Americans face some first-rate units, namely 2nd Waffen-SS "Das Reich", whose impact was weakened by constant losses from Allied fighter-bombers before reaching the scene of battle and whose battle-plans were intercepted by Ultra and thus lost the element of surprise (Mortain offensive). Hastings also makes a very interesting point, which does more to praise the U.S. airborne troops recently portrayed in HBO's excellent "Band of Brothers" series. These paratroopers were supposed to be sent back to England once the Allied foothold on the Continent was secured, but because of poor performance by regular infantry divisions, these paratroopers were forced to take the lead again and again in order to make headway against stubborn German resistance. The invaluable contributions made by American Airborne and Rangers and British Commandos should lay to rest the criticisms made by the regular Army leaders that special forces were a drain on top-notch manpower that should have gone to regular units. Though one could argue that these men could have raised the fighting proficiency of regular infantry units, the esprit de corps generated in elite combat units would still be absent. All in all, one gets the impression that Allied victory in Normandy was inevitable given the total Allied superiority in resources (especially air and naval power), but enough unknowns were still in play to make the outcome interesting. One thing is certain, Hitler's manic micromanagement of German strategy certainly was more of a benefit to the Allied cause than anything the Allied General's planned themselves (with the exception of the entire misdirection campaign aimed at confusing the Germans as to the actual location of the invasion), especially following the bomb plot which almost took Hitler's life. German Generals who knew what to do to save their armies were left powerless to watch Hitler destroy them in his own stupid strategies. I believe it humbling to admit that Allied victory in Normandy had more to do with the failings of the Nazi power structure than any magnificent feat of arms displayed on the battlefield, though the Americans certainly demonstrated more willingness to accept losses and risks than their British & Canadian counterparts.


Balanced and objective masterpiece   June 29, 2002
27 out of 34 found this review helpful

Max Hastings has with this book produced yet another masterpiece. Having read Carlo D'Este's brilliant "Decision in Normandy," I had doubts that anyone could do it better - but Hastings certainly has.
For several years, authors writing about the campaign have had a tendency to repeat comfortable half-truths and myths, and have conveniently forgotten all the problems that dogged the Allied advance. Much space has been devoted to the terrible bocage and to Montgomery's mistakes, but little to the fact that many of the Allied troops - American as well as British - fought poorly and were in the end regarded as unreliable by their own commanders.
Personally, I found it refreshing that the problems the Americans had were finally analized thoroughly. Irritatingly, the British have been blamed for just about everything that went wrong in the campaign, while the American failures(which were just as numerous as the British) have been "forgotten." That is what makes this book so refreshing! Hastings describes the lacklustre performance of numerous American units in great detail, and points out that the airborne divisions had to be kept longer in battle than what was originally intended because other American units fought poorly. At the same time, he describes the similar British problems with brutal honesty.

In the end, one gets a far better understanding of this battle. It becomes clear that the British attacks on Caen was the key to the battle, and that the reason that it took them so long to take it was that the Germans concentrated the bulk of their armour to stop them - leaving the unexperienced Americans a better chance to succeed. It also becomes clear that the Germans fought exceptionally well, and that their superiority over the Allied soldiers time after time frustrated the great plans of the Allied commanders. And above all, it becomes clear that Montgomery - that master of warfare - had to fight with his hands tied because of the lack of British replacements.

In all, a brilliant book from a brilliant author, and one which I will recommend to anyone interested in learning about this legendary campaign.


Problems.....   April 19, 2005
kristalsoldier
19 out of 33 found this review helpful

While I read his Armageddon with interest, I found that much of his perspective is skewed. The same applies even more to Overlord.

In the latter book, he makes the astonishing claim, among others, that Field Marshal Rommel was, by implication, a Nazi - because of his personal loyalty to Hitler. This is absurd. This is like saying that if Sir Max Hastings is proud to be British, he is both an Imperialist and a condoner of the brutalities that often accompanied the British Raj, which any thinking person would rightly dismiss as being absurd.

Sir Max Hastings should realise that there are two primary reasons why Rommel enjoys a 'good' reputation - First - he was a brilliant commander and his legendary exploits in the Desert Campaigns of North Africa - despite certain problems associated with his command style - remain, by far, the best example of how to conduct a campaign based on 'shock and awe' - something that Montgomery could never emulate. Let us not forget that Montgomery's eventual victory at El Alamein was due to 'material superiority' rather than through strategic and tactical dexterity. The second reason is due to Rommel's basic sense of decency - witness his handling of Allied POWs - black, white, brown and Jewish - in North Africa - this is more than what can be said of the British handling of their 'coloured' colonial troops.

It is recently that I realised that Sir Max Hastings was a professional journalist - his lack of academic rigour - at least in the context of "Overlord" and "Armageddon" - thus becomes easier to explain. As a journalist he gives in to sensationalizing and this detracts from the integrity of his texts - though he does have a fluid style of presentation which works well to seduce the 'trusting' reader. But, if Sir Max Hastings is to write a piece of solid work, then his shoddy research, glossing over details and sensationalizing events and personalities will not work.



a splendid account, though comically Anglo-centric   July 21, 2006
Daniel Ford (at danford dot net)
19 out of 26 found this review helpful

Americans who read this study of the Normandy invasion will be astonished to learn how little U.S. troops contributed to Overlord, and how clueless American generals, soldiers, and airmen were. Hastings makes it clear that Montgomery was a fatuous braggart, and that just about all his initiatives went wrong (and that's before the debacle of Market Garden!), but forgives him because he was able to "read" the battlefield. By contrast, Eisenhower, Bradley, and such lesser American commanders as Patton were sadly lacking in strategic vision, no matter that virtually all *their* initatives went right.

When things go badly in the east, where the British and Canadian divisions landed, Hastings generally refers to them as "the Allies," and sometimes even "the British and the Americans," even though there were no Americans in the two-month stalemate at the gates of Caen.

On the west, where the American army quickly broke out of its beachead and romped through thousands of square miles of Britanny and the Cherbourg peninsula, their success is passed over as of no importance. The Germans feared Montgomery the most, Hastings explains, so they put their best divisions in front of the Anglo-Canadian forces, while assigning second-rate and understrength units on the American side. Curiously, the Americans suffered half again as many casualties in the first three months of the campaign. I was left scratching my head over Hastings's skewed vision of the campaign.

I go on at length about this aspect of the book because it is likely to turn off the American reader, and that would be a mistake. Hastings is a good and serious historian, unlike such earlier chroniclers as Stephen Ambrose and Cornelius Ryan; his analysis of German strengths can't be beat, and he interleaves these military-history lessons with scores of personal accounts, some from his own interviews, some from previously unpublished documents. The book should be read by every student of World War Two.

Just don't place much faith in Hastings's view of the comparative merits of the American army on the one hand, and the British and Canadian armies on the other. (His follow-up study, "Armageddon", is much more even-handed.)

-- Dan Ford at the Warbird's Forum