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Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods | 
 enlarge | Author: H. John Poole
Creators: Ray L. Smith, Mike Leahy
Publisher: Posterity Press
Category: Book
List Price: $14.95
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Rating:  26 reviews
Sales Rank: 27474
Media: Paperback
Pages: 360
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.5 x 1
ISBN: 0963869574
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.42
EAN: 9780963869579
ASIN: 0963869574
Publication Date: November 5, 2004
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Book Description
Tactics of the Crescent Moon comes none too soon for deployed U.S. service personnel. Little, if any, of their battlefield intelligence has been tactically interpreted. U.S. analysts are generally more interested in the enemy's strategic or technological capabilities. Even if those analysts did want to tactically assess the information, most lack the infantry and historical background to do so. This book fills that void. It reveals—for the first time in any detail—the most common small-unit maneuvers of the Iraqi and Afghan resistance fighters. Its author is a retired infantryman and recognized authority on guerrilla warfare. He has traveled the world extensively and still trains active-duty U.S. units. Tactics of the Crescent Moon could save many lives (if not turn the tide of war) in the Middle East. It is a heavily researched, well-illustrated, and spell-binding account of how Muslim militants fight. While the book delves mainly into their tactical method, it also uncovers their cultural orientation. This nail-biting nonfiction covers events as recent as 15 September 2004.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 21 more reviews...
Timely and time-sensitive; read to understand Iraq June 17, 2005
Alan D. Cranford (Carson City, NV USA)
97 out of 130 found this review helpful
"Tactics of the Crescent Moon" is timely because of the wars raging in the Middle East. These wars include and are not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has been targeted by Middle Eastern terrorist since the late 1960's. As long as any of these exist, the United States will face Islamic warriors on jihad: the existance of corrupt governments in the Middle East, the existance of the state of Israel, failure to convert wholesale to the "right flavor" of Islam, providing a market for Middle Eastern oil, and lack of a global Islamic empire. The United States first fought Islamic warriors at the beginning of the 19th Century, when a handful of Marines, Sailors, and mercenaries fought and routed the Barbary Pirates. Following the Spanish-American War, Filippino Moros (Muslim tribes on Mindinao) proved so fierce that the .38 caliber Colt revolver was replaced by the .45 caliber Colt automatic pistol. Thus, the Muslim irregular is an old enemy for the United States. Surviving this foe requires a comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy. Basic to a viable startegy is understanding who the enemy is, why he fights, and lastly, how. Poole concentrates on the tactical defeat of the Islamic militant.
American military units are poor at the short-range fight. Hand-to-hand combat has been neglected for reasons ranging from "why waste efforts on something of marginal effectiveness" to creating a female-friendly military environment. These lame excuses favored two groups--military careerists, and the enemy. Close combat training is difficult and dangerous. A zero-defect mentality coupled with the desire to empower women--without giving women the tools that empower--is being overtaken by current events. Units going to Iraq or Afghanistan are getting crash courses in city fighting, room-to-room combat, firing from moving vehicles, and reacting to ambush. Combat units are learning to detect and defuse ambushes before they occur. The US bases in the Middle East are hard targets, with defense in depth. Poole alludes to the timidity about sustaining casualties--it does hamper operations. Also hampering operations is the fear of inflicting collateral damage. Poole points out that skilled infantry can defeat the enemy with a minimum of casualties. This has been happening in Iraq, and the new Iraqi forces are taking over the burden of fighting the Iraqi insurgency. Unlike South Vietnam in 1968, there are not neighbors ready to pounce on Iraq with a large conventional army equipped with lots of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. And if there were, tanks and artillery and aircraft battles are the United States' strong suite. The war for Iraq will be won or lost in street battles. Poole advocates bottom-up squad-focused training and doctrine to defeat the Islamic irregular fighter threat. Because the United States is fighting a war, many of the careerists now recognize that small arms training, squad tactics, and yes, plain old brawling have to be part of the bag of tricks. Marines paid at least lip service to this new old doctrine--now the Army, the Navy, and even the Air Force are conducting realistic and rigorous squad-level training to better-prepare American service members for duty in the Middle East. Trouble is, old habits die hard. Poole recommends that the US goes further, adopting a bottoms-up tactical doctrine that is "circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat compensating." This will shift a larger burden to junior leaders. The biggest shift will be to the individual soldier or Marine on patrol--currently, the capability to run each fire-team size patrol (four or five soliders) from the White House exists. There is a great temptation to do so, even though President Bush was a fighter pilot, not an infantry team leader. Poole argues that the man on the spot is better able to decide what action to take. He's correct as long as the man on the spot has both situational awareness (something that is hard or impossible to do by remote control) and has the other information needed to make the dicision. Plus one more thing--a doctrine that puts decision-making at the lowest possible level. America's most effieicnt industries do this already--the same high-quality people are in business and in our all-volunteer military. It takes time and effort to make a well-rounded knowledgable soldier.
It will be a difficult task. Saddam's minions were specifically trained in deception techniques. The laundry list Poole provides in "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" read like a James Bond movie: advanced psychological training, mind control techniques, and a ruthlessness not possible if we are to meet American societal norms and what Poole terms "moral behavior." One section of Chapter 11 is titled, "Tactics and Morality Are Not Mutually Exclusive."
The Islamic warrior can be beaten. Poole examines the tactical shortcomings of several Islamic jihad groups. A major problem with the Islamic imperial movement is that the jihadists must play first to the Islamic world. It isn't that the jihadists are ineffective playing to a Western audience--they are many times more effective at the media game against the West than the West is against the Islamic world. The guerrilla theater bombing of Madrid did cause the withdrawal of Spanish soldiers. Kidnapping foreigners and holding them hostage until a Western government complies isn't working out very well now, but held great promise while it was still novel. More effective is that the kidnappings have slowed down the flood of foreign workers into Iraq--there's more to winning a guerrilla campaign than killing American soldiers. Guerrilla war is a war of ideas and images.
Poole identifies a major weakness of American forces: movement skills. How can American infantry move through a foreign urban area unseen? The jihadists do so routinely. Some elements, such as Al Queda, have recently began losing their "invisibility cloak" because they're outsiders and don't blend in as well as the insiders. Al Queda's operations have been increasingly directed at Iraqi civilians--the US forces are bottled up in their fortified bastions and there are fewer foreign workersl By necessity of having to act, and having driven off most of the targets, Al Queda has to conduct ethnic cleansing, and is alienating Iraq as a result. The US is not only increasing its mobility when it does patrol, but increasingly the new Iraqi police and Iraqi army are becoming more effective at confronting and destroying Al Queda and other insurgency movements. The number one problem in Iraq is still criminal gangs. This fragmented opposition to the new Iraqi government is compartmented by accident and has trouble coordinating large-scale operations, but is resistant to disruption because the many elements are seperated from each other. In many cases the seperate elements are actualy bitter hereditary enemies--temporarily united to fight the "Crusader" invaders. The fragility of this alliance is off-set by the fact that all these insurgency movements are self-contained. If Al Queda was smashed today, it would be a body blow to the insurgency, but not a knock-out punch. The insurgents use the Iraqi population as a shield and data bank. US artillery crews are being used as infantry because the cannon shells are not very useful in this war, but infantry patrols are indespensible.
Will the US military establishment finally follow the model of Heinlein's 1956 novel, "Starship Trooper?" Heinlein's elite force was the Mobile Infantry, a handful of high-tech troops that applied force surgically in surprise raids that combined speed, stealth, firepower, and intelligence. When one of these four was missing, the raid came to grief. In that novel, the most dangerous enemies, the "bugs," moved underground unseen (much like the Oriental warriors in Poole's books) and defeated Earth's soldiers in close combat where the humans were at a disadvantage. The hero of that novel, a sergeant named Zim, used initiative and on-the-spot situational awareness to capture a "bug brain," winning a hard-fought campaign. Heinlein's novels showcased the strengths and weaknesses that Poole's book discusses--both American and Oriental warrior. The Islamic warrior is not as readily identifiable as Heinlein's bug warriors. The Islamic terrorist is no hive creature--and the hive in that science fiction novel proved to be crafty and innovative.
One last note--suicide warriors are nothing new for American GI's. The Japanese kamakazi was the most-organized and may be the most famous example, but he wasn't the first. Many American Indian tribes ritually purified their warrior's souls before battle--the warrior didn't enter battle to die, but was already dead. This freed him from worrying about death and made him more effective. The US cavalry was more worried about catching fleeing Indian bands than encountering "suicidal" Indian braves. In the Philippines, the Moro ritually prepared himself to enter Paradise prior to running amok with a barong among US troops. About the same time, the Boxers in China underwent pre-battle preparation that made them "immune" to bullets and was more or less funeral rites. Despite being "godless communists," the Chinese and North Korean soldiers sometimes used the suicide option, complete with body bomb. The Viet Cong and NVA were credited with doing this frequently. My question is why American soldiers are not better-prepared to face this common threat. Suicide bombers proved to be cost-effective in lives for the PLO--one truck bomb took out the Marine barracks in Beruit and killed over 240 Americans. One PLO suicide driver died. The American response was to bomb a refugee camp--two aircraft shot down, two naval aviators killed, and one captured--and zero PLO fighters were in the camp. Given the disparity in firepower, the suicide bomber seems to be a lifesaver for the insurgency movement. Non-suicide ambushes between American forces and insurgents in Iraq typically end one of two ways--the insurgents escape inflicting few casualties, or the insurgents get wiped out while inflicting multiple American casualties. One successful Iraqi tactic is to drive a car bomb into an American convoy. Because many of the drivers are now contractor personnel, the suicide bomber may only kill some poor kid from Pakistan or another Islamic country--but suicide bombers die so that the insurgency can strike blows with minimal losses. Sometimes a car bomb will kill four or five American servicemen and make headlines.
Poole mentions how the human wave attack seems to disregard human life, but actually is a smart, life-sparing tactic for America's Oriental enemies. Rather than wasting the lives of the Iraqi insurgency, suicide bombers seem to be a cost-effective way of killing the intended target, and have the bonus of psychological impact on the Western media, and the American soldier. So why is America still surprised by ruthless, violent, often suicidal close-range attack?
This book could turn the tide in the war on terror November 19, 2004
Blacksheep (US Army)
62 out of 74 found this review helpful
This book is truly remarkable. In Tactics of the Crescent Moon, John Poole provides an incredibly insightful analysis of the Middle Eastern problem and our role in trying to resolve it. He explains extremely complicated issues with remarkable clarity, examining them from historical, political, cultural, military and moral perspectives. Despite the immense scope of the book, his key insights never get lost in the complexity of his subject matter. At the most fundamental level, John Poole provides detailed tactical descriptions of exactly how our Middle Eastern adversaries fight. To illuminate the big picture, he clearly shows how these tactical examples relate to the larger cultural and political issues. He goes on to propose solutions that can help American privates survive, help commanders make better decisions, help generals develop better strategies and even help politicians make better military policies. Most importantly, the book's profound morality offers insight on how to win what might be the most important battle of all, the battle for the moral high ground. We will not win this war on terrorism if we lose touch, even for a moment, with the great and noble values that make us who we are. John Poole reminds us that when Americans go to war we bring with us our honor, our compassion, our love of freedom, and our belief in the equality of all people. Our morality is our ultimate weapon.
Special Operations must read October 12, 2005
M. Sexton (USA)
43 out of 45 found this review helpful
Having read the book and been impressed with how author join Poole has distilled into a readable and understandable format, the tactics techniques and ideology of muslim fighters, I have gained a perspective on their tactical methods that I did not have or could not have learned by a generalized study.
Gunny Poole has done the hard work of research for the grunt and special operations soldier. It is a book that gives a TACTICAL perspective explaining the subtleties of the eastern (south west asia in this case) tactical mindset.
As a current Special Forces soldier who has been to both Afghanistan and Iraq I RECCOMEND THIS BOOK.
I am also humbled by the experience and knowledge of those here and elsewhere who have reviewed and reccommended Gunny Poole's books and only offer my perspective from a sergeant's and operators viewpoint.
This book is not meant to give a big picture theorist a perspective on middle eastern culture and geo politics. And rightly so. It is a thought provoking and pertinent study for the soldier on the ground. Fighting the militants (insurgent).
No military study is currently availble that gives the tactical mindset and explains it as Mr Poole has. The only other that comes close is Afghan Guerilla war, a series of vignettes in the words of the Afghan mujahideen, which the soldier then has to try to figure out their tactical method within the given context.
Gunny Poole's Book Tactics of the Crescent Moon is better way for soldiers to learn the enemy.
If you want a book about US failures and how our real strategy is land and resource aquisition as one reviewer here lamented about, look elesewhere.
This book is for the guy on the ground who will be doing the fighting and the men that will plan and lead those operations.
Extraordinary--Breaks the Code and Outs China and Iran April 24, 2005
Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States)
29 out of 48 found this review helpful
This book is quite extraordinary, and all of the reviews are helpful in appreciating its content. The author has done a brilliant meticulous job of culling through open source references to create a thoughtful, well-structured, and superbly foot-noted document that is nothing less than "Ref A" for what must become the new "American Way of War."
Big ideas:
1) One third of the world is Muslim, and if we do not restore morality to our form of democratic capitalism, and they adopt asymmetric warfare techniques, we are toast.
2) Iran certainly, and China probably, are fostering global terror as part of their grand strategy--each with different objectives--to end Anerica's status as a super-power.
3) Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia continue to train and support terrorists, with North Korea, Yemen, Sudan and various other countries (e.g. Bangladesh) having diverse roles to play.
4) Hezbollah out of Iran, rather than Al Qaeda out of Saudi Arabia, is the major player in the Iraqi insurgency, and its methods (hostages, suicide bombings, disguised IEDs) are clearly visible across the Iraqi theater of operations and now beginning to appear elsewhere in the world.
5) We cannot win 4th generation asymmetric wars with firepower alone. The heart of the book is a dissection of the Muslim insurgent's inspired excellence at close and asymmetric combat, and a carefully articulated case for getting back into the business of field light infantry that has the skill to infiltrate, surprise, and defeat enemies "mano a mano"--as some of us have been saying for some time (my own phrase has been "one man, one bullet"), but this author does a fantastic job of nailing it in war-fighting terms, modern way must be won by bottom up squad-level observation and skill, not top down command and control wielding firepower that kills 10-100 non-combatants for every US life that it might save (and ultimately--the author is compelling on this point--the deaths of those non-combatants inspire more suicidal terrorists who kill more US fighting men and women than might have died if we had done it right in the first place.
6) The author outlines in detail, with absolutely first-class documentation of his many sources (this is the first book I can remember reading where a single short sentence might contain as many as six different footnotes) the tactical techniques that Muslim radicals have learned to use, to including tunnels and disguises for both themselves and their Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). I agree with General Zinni--this book is required reading for every member of our Armed Forces, from Private to General. If you have a loved one in the Armed Forces, buy them this book and send it to them immediately.
7) Light infantry, acting as a gendarme with superior human intelligence, can nail the terrorists, but unless we want to occupy the world--something impossible to do (see point one)--then we must mobilize all of the instruments of national power and dedicate ourselves to nurturing legitimate effective *indigenous* governments everywhere. That means we must stop supporting 44 dictators, and we must stop imposing immoral capitalism (carpetbagging) on South America, Asia, and Africa.
This book is nothing short of ispirational. Sadly, it will probably be ignored by the Pentagon because, as the author himself points out, the old outdated and ineffective American Way of War is based predominantly on massive firepower and a heavy contractor presence that is most profitable for our arms merchants (see General Smedley Butler, "War is a Raquet") and our beltway bandits. Consequently, I pray that this book will be bought, read, and acted upon by anyone who has every served in the U.S. military, is serving now, or knows someone now serving or likely to serve (I have three boys, the oldest will be of draft age in two years). What we are paying for now is not working and time is running out. We need a fundamental change in direction, and that will not happen absent a national uprising, or at Tom Atlee would say, "from group magic to a wise democracy."
The author gets special high marks from me for relating morality and our acknowledgement of God to being able to win at war. He is absolutely right to castigate the Supreme Court for removing God from our national fabric, and points out that the same Supreme Court once declared slaves to be non-humans. He understands, as Clausewitz did, that the moral is to the material by at least one order of magnitude--in today's information-rich era, I would double it. Morality matters, and we have lost that high ground by allowing special interests to dictate America's profiteering foreign policy, rather than letting the common sense of the American people enrich America's foreign policy for the common good of all--as the Golden Rule suggests: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
If the public demands that its politicians attend to this author's views, and if our military leaders--both suited and uniformed--attend to this book, it will save hundreds of thousands of lives, tens of billions of dollars, and perhaps the American way of life.
See the links at Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower
Review: Tactics of the Crescent Moon October 8, 2005
Jenkki Soturi (US of A)
20 out of 22 found this review helpful
To begin this look at H. John Poole's latest work, let's outline what it's not -
- Not a Middle East History tome;
- Not a guide to recent terror operations;
- Not a tactical discussion; and
- Not an approach to military reform.
No, it is not any one of the above - it combines all these into a coherent, concise guide to anyone interested in understanding our military problems in the Middle East.
Section one discusses Muslim military campaigns from Gallipoli during WWI to Israel's expulsion from Lebanon by the Hezbollah. Section two examines the different Muslim militant groups. Section three provides one of the first coherent looks at Muslim militant groups' training and tactical techniques - and tactical approaches to defeating them.
Certain themes, appearing in other works by Poole, as well as in "Tactics...", compare and contrast U.S. military traits and capabilities to our Muslim opponents', to include the following:
"Us" - doctrinally driven, top-down training environment; versus
"them" - bottom-up, experimentally driven.
"Us" - squads depend on artillery fire to advance; versus
"them" - primary groups that can move unnoticed.
"Us" - occuppies ground; versus
"them" - consolidates regions.
"Us" - training instructors stick to standardized procedures; versus "them' - training techniques developed through experience.
"Us" - enhance control by standardizing tactical procedures; versus "them" - disseminating battle-tested techniques for refinement through practice.
"Us" - handicapped by inane bureaucratic procedure; versus
"them" - copying tactical ideas from any source and experimenting under simulated battle conditions... A lot of America's adversaries, of late, seem to have these traits.
Poole also notes that to beat the Muslim terrorist in the military domain, our forces must, among other things -
- recognize the strategic significance of non-combatants and not treat them as so many expendable sacks of potatoes;
- provide the infantry squads with a much higher level of tactical training; and
- learn to evolve tactically on the primary group level.
Military reform has been bantered about in terms of "hi-tech" improvements to military infrastructure and precision "first-strike" weapons; Poole looks at the wars we fight now and notes that success will depend more on the "software" in the brain-housing groups of our infantrymen than that in our computers. Fourth Generation Warfare doesn't depend on hi-tech hardware and inexhaustible supplies of munitions - the guarantor of Western hegemony in the Twentieth Century - it depends on keen intelligence networks - humint as well as techint - agile tactical evolution of the mix of forces, their methodologies and training, and decentralized command. Most of our recent technology has facilitated ever more centralized direction of forces.
Will the U.S. war colleges and staff academies be looking carefully in Poole's recommended directions for military reform? Perhaps not - but Poole is addressing the conflict we'refighting. Anyone headed to Iraq or Afghanistan will find "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" a worthwhile read.
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