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Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763 | 
enlarge | Author: Henry Kamen Publisher: Harper Perennial Category: Book
List Price: $19.95 Buy Used: $3.06 You Save: $16.89 (85%)
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Rating: 14 reviews Sales Rank: 233865
Media: Paperback Pages: 640 Number Of Items: 1 Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.5 Dimensions (in): 8.8 x 6 x 1.2
ISBN: 0060932643 Dewey Decimal Number: 946 EAN: 9780060932640 ASIN: 0060932643
Publication Date: February 2004 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Shipping: Expedited shipping available Shipping: International shipping available Condition: * Item in good condition- Typical Used Book and at a great price! * We carefully inspected this * Great customer service * Satisfaction Guaranteed!
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Product Description
From the late-fifteenth to the mid-eighteenth century, Spain was the most extensive empire the world had seen, stretching from Naples and the Netherlands to the Philippines. This provocative work of history attributes Spain's rise to power to the collaboration of international business interests, including Italian financiers, German technicians, and Dutch traders. At the height of its power, the Spanish Empire was a global enterprise in which non-Spaniards -- Portuguese, Basque, Aztec, Genoese, Chinese, Flemish, West African, Incan, and Neapolitan -- played an essential role. Challenging, persuasive, and unique in its thesis, Henry Kamen's Empire explores Spain's complex impact on world history with admirable clarity and intelligence.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 9 more reviews...
The Reign Explained March 4, 2003 Bruce Loveitt (Ogdensburg, NY USA) 44 out of 55 found this review helpful
Mr. Kamen begins his book with the following lines of Bertolt Brecht: "The young Alexander conquered India. All by himself? Caesar beat the Gauls. Didn't he even have a cook with him?" The answers are obvious. Mr. Kamen asks a different question: Who built the Spanish Empire? The answer to that question seems obvious, also....the Spanish, right? But Mr. Kamen spends the next 500 pages showing us that the obvious answer, in this case, is the wrong answer. In a dazzling display of erudition, covering events in Granada, North Africa, Italy, the Spanish Netherlands, the Caribbean, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, etc., the author reveals that the Spanish Empire was built and maintained with the help of the people of many nations- that it was a true "multinational enterprise." Mr. Kamen also shows that rather than the Empire being created by Spain, Spain was created by the Empire- for, at the starting point of the book, 1492, there really was no such entity as Spain. Like several European countries of the time, such as Italy and Germany, Spain consisted of many geographical units- each with its own language and/or culture, and people felt a loyalty to that particular area rather than to the larger abstraction called Spain. Only after the Empire developed and the language of the largest geographical area, Castile, became the language of Empire did people start to think of themselves as belonging to something bigger than the particular region they lived in. Mr. Kamen also points out that the population of Spain (which was much less than that of France or England) was never great enough to provide the quantity of soldiers needed to support the far-flung Empire. Where did this Empire come from, though? When Ferdinand of Aragon died in 1516 the thrones of Castile and Aragon passed to his grandson, the archduke Charles of Habsburg (known to us as Charles V). Charles was born in Ghent and raised in the Netherlands. In 1520 he was crowned Holy Roman Emperor. Besides Spain, his responsibilities included (from his Burgundian inheritance) the Netherlands and (from his Habsburg inheritance) also Austria, Hungary, Naples, Sicily and the continent of America. So, the Empire started by inheritance rather than by conquest. But, to maintain what already existed and to, later on, "branch out," Charles and later rulers had access to the people and resources of these various possessions. Thus, most of the soldiers were Italians, Belgians, Germans, etc. with the addition of mercenaries, such as Swiss troops, when needed. As Castile didn't have the financial resources necessary to handle the responsibilities that went along with administering these areas, most of the financing was provided by the bankers of Milan, Genoa, Amsterdam, etc. When the Empire expanded to encompass the Caribbean, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, etc., it had to rely on native peoples, and African slaves, for manpower. The Spanish didn't have the muscle to conquer and control these vast areas and had to rely on cooperation, usually, rather than coercion. Fortunately for the conquistadors, native tribes were usually at war with one another and some of them were only too willing to form alliances with the Spanish in order to defeat powerful enemies, such as the Aztecs or Incas. Even so, the areas under Spanish control were usually not extensive, as they still didn't have enough manpower to control large regions. Tribes that were hostile to the Spanish would simply go elsewhere and the two sides would generally just stay clear of one another. These arrangements also existed in the American Southwest. In the Philippines, again, the Spanish presence was so slight that they had to depend on native Filipinos for labor and on outsiders, such as the Chinese, in order to maintain a trading network. Mr. Kamen is particularly fascinating when he helps us to follow the "money trail." The huge amounts of silver mined in Mexico and Peru went both west (to the Philippines and, ultimately, to China) to pay for trade goods and east (to the Italian and Dutch bankers, and to many places all over Europe) to pay off soldiers and loans- and to buy the goods that people in Spain desired but couldn't produce themselves. It is interesting to note that the Spanish even found it necessary to have most of their ships manufactured in other countries. So, the vast amounts of silver did not end up in the coffers of Spain, but went towards "growing" (in modern parlance) the economies of many countries. Mr. Kamen notes the irony that when the Empire started to decline in the last half of the 17th century, Spain's enemies had to be careful not to let her fall too far, lest they drag themselves down with her! I don't, however, want to make this book sound like an economics treatise. Mr. Kamen's book is intended for the general reader and although he uses statistics to support his arguments he never loses sight of the human element. He talks about the cultural aspects of the Empire- how Spain expected the other countries she dealt with to learn Castilian, while not even the Spanish diplomats (in most cases) would bother to learn the languages of the other countries; how the people of other countries were eager to read Spanish literature but how the Spanish were very insular and not much interested in other countries (again, this is generally speaking). The human touch is present in many places as Mr. Kamen gives us excerpts from the narratives of diplomats, soldiers, missionaries, etc. I found I had to read slowly, not because the book had an awkward style (quite the contrary- the prose is often elegant) but because the ideas being presented were new to me and also because the book was so wide-ranging in time, space and content. The book represents a lifetime of learning and thinking by the author and it is a very rewarding experience for the reader.
Historical revisionist non-sequiter December 30, 2004 Griffwampatuba (No Place You Need to Know About) 42 out of 58 found this review helpful
This is not Henry Kamen's book. Mr. Kamen did not finance the publishing of this book or it's marketing (this was performed by Harper Collins Publishers). He did not design the cover jacket or perform the actual printing, paper cutting or binding. Furthermore, Mr. Kamen did not create the computers and/or typewriters he used in 'writing' the 'manuscript'. In addition, he did not write any of the other books mentioned in the Bibliography and Notes. He did not locate, collect and catalog the source materials. And, of course, he had nothing to do with the actual events recorded in the 'book'. Therefore, to speak of this book as "Henry Kamen's" book is an act of arrogant and ignorant pride. Now, if you can see through the inanity of the above, then you'll be able to grasp the failure of Henry Kamen's central thesis in "Empire." He tries to make the case that the Spanish Empire was neither Spanish nor an Empire (along the lines of Voltaire's quip about the Holy Roman Empire). The main premise in his argument is that since the Spanish Empire was not created entirely by Spaniards using only Spanish money and all Spanish technology (etc., etc.), that therefore it is more properly to be called a corporate empire, an international one, or whatever. The short demolition of this thesis lies in my 1st paragraph. Mr. Kamen can claim this book as his own because he had the Vision for it and because it would not have existed without his effort. It may be that all the materials capable of producing the book "Empire" already existed and Mr. Kamen had nothing to do with them. But it does not follow that "Empire" would have come into being without the active input and motivation of Mr. Kamen. If he (or you) doubts it, just try to take away his royalty checks. Likewise, the Spanish Empire did not come into being simply because Genoese bankers and adventurers had money to lend and time to kill. It did not happen because American Indians fought amongst themselves or because most of Western Europe was eager to see the liberation of the Maghreb. There are reasons why, in the 16th century, the French or Genoese, or German merchants did not create the first world-wide empire on five continents. Unfortunately, you'll not learn about them by reading this book. There are several failures of logic that run throughout Mr. Kamen's argument. First is his complete failure to grasp the basics of economics. Throughout the book he makes continual snide remarks about how this or that technology or advance in information used by the Spaniards was nothing more than an input from some other country or culture. Now, the last time I checked, nothing in life is free. If the Spaniards were able to buy books from abroad instead of manufacturing them at home, or to use the military technology of rival countries, they were only able to do so because they had something of unique value to give in return. This is the basic economics of trade. So, what was it that the Spaniards had of unique value that helped them to acquire the things they did not have? Again, Mr. Kamen does not say. Perhaps it was the early political stability that Ferdinand helped to create? Mr. Kamen notes this but then does seem to think it amounts to much in the way of explaining Spain's success. Or perhaps it was their location, an attribute of happenstance, maybe, but valuable enough. Or was it the new-found energy, confidence and adventursomeness that characterized Spanish culture in the 16th Century? Mr. Kamen does the Spanish a disservice by papering over these kinds of valuables. Then, of course, there are the hypocritical attacks on Westerners in general. Westerners (e.g. White European Christians) during the Early Modern Period are constantly denigrated for supposedly being oblivious to the cultures of other societies and of always trying to "go-it-alone" because of blind arrogance or racism, or something. But in "Empire", Mr. Kamen reverses the charges. Because the Spanish used their abilities at leading other peoples and their sound (and clever) diplomacy in creating their Empire, Mr. Kamen now says that THIS disqualifies them from any praise as well!! What's a poor Western White Boy to do?!?! When you do your own thing you're accused of obscurantism and arrogance; when you learn about other cultures and use their skills or even integrate with them, then you're just a weak cipher who can't do anything himself. Sheeeesh!! Finally, the most basic failure of Mr. Kamen's thesis is an inability to prove that the Spanish were somehow unique in the way they formed their Empire. After Rome had conquered the Samnites and Etruscans closest to them, you could have easily said that it really wasn't a Roman Empire, but a Samnite and Magna Greacian Empire. Likewise with the Muslim Empire. Most of the warriors making up the Muslim armies in Africa and Persia and elsewhere where slaves of many different races. You could go on and on about any and all such political combinations. It would have been much more fruitful if Mr. Kamen had tried to give a good definition of why we name an Empire after a particular country or culture. Is it because of a common language? The location of the central city? The legal code (a la Napoleon's Empire, and even Rome's to some extant), or what? Unfortunately, Mr. Kamen seems bent on simply denigrating the Spanish to no observable purpose. So the next time you get a bonus at work or a good grade on a test, just pick up Henry Kamen's "Empire" and prove to yourself that you had nothing to do with it after all! P.S - one of my pet peeves is the use of quotations around words to deligitimize a concept by bypassing any argument. Kamen does this repeatedly in the book, placing the word empire in quotation marks whenever it refers to the Spanish Empire. Cheap shot and then some! For a good analysis of this technique by various hacks, see David Stove's essay "Neutralizing Success Words" in his collection "Scientific Irrationalism."
Empire: the Spanish Version March 28, 2003 pnotley@hotmail.com (Edmonton, Alberta Canada) 29 out of 35 found this review helpful
To outsiders the history of Early Modern Spain appears as a story of decline. On the one hand Spain from 1492 onwards was one of the largest empires in history, ranging from Naples to Manilla, controlling much of Germany and Italy, as well as what is now Holland and Belgium. It was responsible for destroying two great urban civilizations, the Aztec and the Inca, and for shattering the culture and society of an entire hemisphere. Yet after the defeat of the Spanish Armada the history of the Empire appears to be a slow and agonizing decline, while Spain itself turned from being the feared master of Europe to a poor isolated periphery. It is the virtue of Henry Kamen's book that he shows this to be an illusion. Kamen is one of the leading historians of Spain and the last decade has been a prolific one for him, since he has also written an important study of the counter-reformation in Catalonia, biographies of Philip II and Philip V, as well as a revision of his book on the Spanish Inquisition. In Kamen's new book he shows that Spain was always a poor country on the periphery of Europe. How then did it dominate much of the world? The short answer is that it didn't really, and it had a lot of help to dominate what it did. People tend to think that the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella created a united Spain. Not true. What it did was create a system in which the various territories and regions that made up Spain were ruled by a common monarch. But each region, as well as much of the rest of the Spanish empire, had its own sets of privileges and local assemblies. No unified Spanish state existed in 1492 and would not for centuries to come. The result was that Spain had no coherent bureaucracy and could never have formed its vast armies on its own resources and populations. It relied heavily on foreign mercenaries. Belgians were crucial to the success at St. Quentin in the 1550s, the Italians for the victory at Lepanto in the 1570s. The Spaniards made up only a sixth of the soldiers ruling Italy in 1544 Italy. The Guarani Indians, under the Jesuit missions made famous in the rather inaccurate film "The Mission," aided the Spanish 50 times, and successfully fought off, at times, the British, the French, and the Portuguese. Indian allies were crucial to the conquest of the Americas, while the free blacks also played a vital role. Financiers from Italy and Belgium and elsewhere funded the Empire. Columbus was an Italian, with no Castillians on his first voyage, while Magellan was Portuguese. Spain could never have funded the armies to conquer the Americans. Instead it made offers that were taken up by ambitious freebooters. The power of the Spaniards was often weak. Officially, it had expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492. Officially, its armies fought to purge Europe of heretical Protestantism. Officially, it maintained a monopoly on all trade with the Americas. In fact many Jews stayed on in Spain for decades, in fact many of its polyglot empire were Protestant, in fact "unofficial" trade with foreign powers was always the norm and by the late 1600s they dominated the trade and kept the empire alive for its own purposes. Whether in New Mexico, or Peru or the Philippines, Catholicism made only limited and superficial progress, while the colony at Manilla survived only because of the sufferance of China and Japan. Kamen is not the most interesting writer, but there is much of interest for the reader to find. One could read this book as an example of early globalization. Yet one should not think that this was a benign and gloriously cosmpolitan process, as Niall Ferguson argues in his upcoming book on the British Empire. While books flooded into Spain, the Spanish could not bother to translate English or French works. Whether in Holland or in England or in France, Spanish officials could not be bothered to learn the local language, even including the ambassadors. Philip II made in his Escorial the finest European collection of Arab manuscripts, which the Castillians were unable to use or appreciate because virtually none of them bothered to learn Arabic. Although Castillians engaged in glorious feats of exploration they failed to create a real travel literature. They did not appreciate the value of tomatoes and beans for decades (though not from a shortage of hungry Spaniards). One Spanish botanist actually did some major work and wrote an account in the 1570s. There it remained lost in the Escorial until 1651 when some Italian intellectuals thought of the bright idea of publishing it. Although many Spaniards were horrified at the Destruction of the Indies and the brutal savagery against Holland, "Official" Castillian culture was dangerously vain and uncurious. Throughout the book I thought Kamen made too much of the independence of the Amerindians. After all when Latin America won independence Spanish was the official language and any indigenista tendencies took second place to Catholic or Secular ideologies. But ultimately this is not a complacent book. Kamen not only reminds us that Pizarro exorted 20 tons of silver and gold from Athalupa. He also reminds us that these 20 tons consisted of priceless sculptures and art which Pizarro thoughtlessly melted down to turn into ignots. (He also reminds us that most Spanish intellectuals condemned Pizarro's execution of Athalupa as murder.) The Slave Trade, the extinction of the native population of the Carribean, the horrors of the 30 years war and the war of Dutch Independence; how many people know that in 1603 23,000 Chinese were slaughtered in Manilla by Imperial forces? As Kamen concludes, for all the "glory" the Empire brought to some, "for very many others it was one of almost unrelieved desolation."
Kamen, or how to make money being controversial March 11, 2003 Dario Julio Romani Garcia (Spain) 21 out of 35 found this review helpful
The book exposes the *personal opinion of the author* about a subject that other historians have wrote about with greater impartiality and sense of historic justice.Kamen's book is an attempt of downplaying the history of Spain and offering thus a negative image of its national identity, it's language, and in general, of the part played by the Spaniards in the scenario of History. With friends like Kamen, Spain doesn't need enemies. According to the author, the participation of the Spanish in the battles of Pavia, Muehlberg, Saint Quentin, Almansa and, in general, in all the great battles was minor and irrelevant. It seems that only in the Sack of Rome do the Spanish share "in equal proportions with Germans and Italians" (page 83) the "glory". For Kamen, the Conquest of America didn't exist as such, according to him, the successes of the "supposed" conquerors were owed to the superstition and naivete of the indian peoples. If the key discovery of Kamen is that the Spanish imperial enterprise was "choral" in nature, somebody has to suggest him that he should apply his bright discovery to other historical entities. Since Mommsen it's known that the history of the great empires is the history of a "vast system of incorporations". If that was the case with the Roman Empire, and so it's today with the USA, I don't believe that in Spain's case it should be a motive of shame. The book of Kamen has been taken apart by many historians, specialists in their field, that have disproven the outright falsehoods, mistakes, and half truths of this book. Particularly galling is the blatant ignorance and disregard in military matters. This book deserves to go to the dump along with the works of Thomas, Preston and others not worth mentioning. It's just historical "best seller" fodder, not serious academical research, for an English speaking audience that lacks cross references and only reinforces the distrust towards so-called British historians that take advantage of an inexplored field and gullibility of a public that has no access to the real stuff.
Solid Study May 23, 2003 R. Albin (Ann Arbor, Michigan United States) 16 out of 17 found this review helpful
This is an interesting history of the Spanish Empire from its foundation at the end of the Reconquest of Spain to the 18th century. The author is a leading authority on early modern Spain. Kamen has two primary objectives. The first is simply to provide an accurate narrative history of the Empire. The second is to rebut nationalistic claims that the Spanish Empire resulted from the formation and activities of a powerful Spanish (actually Castillian) state. As can be seen by some of the negative comments of prior reviewers, this second objective is surprisingly controversial. Kamen demonstrates well that early modern Castille was not a strong state and that the assembly of the huge Spanish Empire resulted from a confluence of factors that had relatively little to do with the strength of Castille. A crucial fact was the dynastic good luck of the Castillian state. A series of very competent rulers - Ferdinand and Isabella, Charles V, Phillip II - were in charge during the formation of the Empire. Beyond their own personal abilities, they were also pan-European figures and the formation of the Empire owed a great deal to the fact that the ruling dynasty was able to tap into the talents and capital of other European entities. The Castillian monarchs also exercised power in the Low Countries and Italy, and under Charles V, in Central Europe. These territories and resources were crucial for building the Empire. Kamen shows very well the multi-ethnic and trans-national aspects of the Empire. A great deal of the capital for overseas investment came from Italy. Italians, Flemings, and Germans were all important servants of the Crown. The assembly of the Empire in the Western Hemisphere was largely a private enterprise though the Crown did provide crucial captial and sanctions. While most have concentrated on the Western Hemisphere, Kamen does an excellent job of reviewing the Empire in Europe and imperial efforts in North Africa. Kamen is concerned also with undermining the view that the conquest of the Americas was due to the overwhelming power of the Europeans. He points out repeatedly the importance of native American allies and the crucial role of epidemics involving imported diseases. In this context, Kamen probably misses a chance to make an important connection. Not only did epidemic disease facilitate conquest but it really made it possible for the Europeans to impose their culture, language, and rule in permanent ways. As Hugh Thomas pointed out in his book on the conquest of Mexico, without the huge depopulations that followed the conquest, the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere might have resembled British India in the 18th and early 19th centuries, an administrative European veneer over a powerful native culture. Kamen shows very well the weaknesses of the Empire. Since Castille was not a strong state, the success of the Empire depended crucially on appropriate management of resources contributed from the holdings of the Empire. Without a competent dynast at the center, problems occurred. Also, problems in one important part of the Empire tremendously affected the rest of the Empire. The revolt of the Netherlands played a large role in dissipating the windfall of precious metals from the Western Hemisphere. A real virtue of this book is how it shows how rapidly the linkages between the Americas and Europe developed. Surprisingly, however, the Castillians themselves never became particularly cosmopolitan. Despite being the center of this huge Empire, Castillians remained insular. In later decades, Spanish Emperors had difficulty finding individuals with the language skills to serve as diplomats, and Castille was relatively intellectually barren. In the long run, the inability of Spain itself to become a major financial, intellectual, or industrial center doomed the Empire to failure.
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