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The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual | 
 enlarge | Creators: John A. Nagl, David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Category: Book
List Price: $15.00
Buy Used: $7.99
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Rating:  16 reviews
Sales Rank: 5843
Media: Paperback
Edition: University of Chicago Press Ed. /
Pages: 472
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 8.8 x 6 x 1.1
ISBN: 0226841510
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.0218
EAN: 9780226841519
ASIN: 0226841510
Publication Date: July 4, 2007
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.
The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine.
An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come.
The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 11 more reviews...
Counterinsurgency Field Manual August 23, 2007
Joseph P. Martino (Sidney, OH USA)
66 out of 72 found this review helpful
This book has become famous or notorious (take you pick) because it was written under the direction of Gen. David H. Petraeus, as of this review the commanding general of American forces in Iraq. I want to prescind from the Iraq question and address the book on its own merits.
First, my qualifications. I am a retired Air Force Colonel (non-flying). During the Vietnam war I was heavily involved in Operations Research on counterinsurgency. For five years I was Chairman of the Special Warfare Working Group of the Military Operations Research Society. I spent 20 months in Thailand and Vietnam, running tests on electronic equipment for use by US and allied forces battling insurgents, and gathering and analyzing data on insurgency in Vietnam and Laos.
What's in this book?
Chapter One is a historical survey of insurgency and the problems of countering it. It draws heavily from the Vietnam experience, but goes as far back as the ethnic struggles in England (Welsh, Scots, Irish) against the Crown. While the historical coverage is broad, it does not, and is not intended to, give coverage in depth.
Chapter Two discusses the need for integration of the civilian and military activities in counterinsurgency. What's new about this? Nothing. I wrote the same things (though perhaps not as well) while in Southeast Asia over forty years ago. The fact that it's not new doesn't mean it's not important. It's critical. The fact that it's now in a Field Manual is highly significant.
Chapter Three deals with intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency. While the military commander is always in need of intelligence about the enemy (who, where, what, when), the problems of gathering this intelligence for counterinsurgency are very different from those of conventional war. This chapter is heavy on the "what" of intelligence, but a bit weak on the "how." This is probably inevitable, since intelligence about insurgents depends on human sources, and the avalabiliity of these is very dependent on the nature of the society under attack by insurgents. One problem briefly mentioned in the chapter is the fact that Americans won't speak the language of the locals. The problems of linguistic support for the counterinsurgency operation are covered in an appendix. My own experience, though, is that it's difficult to work through an interpreter, and you never know if the interpreter really is working for the insurgents.
Chapter Four covers designing a counterinsurgency campaign. Again, it's strong on the "what" but weak on the "how," because this is strongly dependent on the situation.
Chapter Five covers executing counterinsurgency operations. Its main point is that "Counterinsurgency operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, pshychological, and civic actions." Nothing new here. We knew that in Vietnam. The British knew it in Malaya. What's encouraging is that it's finally in a Field Manual.
Chapter Six covers developing host nation security forces (army and police). That's not easy. The British achieved it in Malaya; we didn't achieve it in Vietnam. One of the problems the Manual really slides over is that the recruits to the host nation army know the individual Americans will go home after a year, while they are in it "for the duration." This makes a big difference in the degree of aggressiveness of the host soldiers as compared with the American counterinsurgency forces.
Chapter Seven covers leadership and ethics for counterinsurgency. This is the first Field Manual I've seen that gives any attention to the Just War criteria of Discrimination and Proportion. Although these are addressed in only two pages, that's still an improvement. (Full disclosure: I teach Just War Doctrine at Yorktown University.)
Chapter Eight covers logistics for counterinsurgency. This becomes a critical issue. Ever since World War Two, the US has preferred to fight "dumb rich" wars as opposed to "smart frugal" wars. We overwhelm the opponent with materiel. Unfortunately, the host nation usually can't do this. Leaving a stable society behind when we "declare victory and go home" means the host nation has to be capable of defending itself on a much lower level of resources than we used. If we don't train them to do this, they won't last long.
One specific criticism I have of the Manual is that it tends to focus on "boots on the ground" and shortchange the role of air power. This is probably inevitable, since it's an Army manual. Nevertheless, it's a shortcoming. Despite that, I think the Manual is a big step forward in doctrine for counterinsurgency. It lays out the lessons we should have learned forty years ago.
The University of Chicago edition has an Introduction by Sarah Sewall. She makes the observation that the book was written by the wrong people. It was written by the military, not by the political branch of government. As Clausewitz wrote, "War is the continuation of policy by other means." Counterinsurgency, of all types of war, must especially be governed by political objectives and considerations. Sewall's observation is correct. In the absence of any national counterinsurgency doctrine that covers the political and economic aspects as well as the military, the Army has tried to fill the gap. For the most part, the Army did a good job. It will be unfortunate if the effect of this book is one more case of "we won the war but lost the peace."
More Then a Reprint!!! July 25, 2007
Troy A. Lettieri (NC, USA)
46 out of 51 found this review helpful
This is a reprint of the Army/Marine Counter-Insurgency (COIN) manual. But this book is more then a reprint and is worth the money just for the multiple forewords and the Introduction to this edition. All were written by subject matter experts in their field. One foreword in particular is written by John Nagal author of the COIN cult "Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" re-released as "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," what makes this so interesting is that Nagal had a hand in developing and writing the manual with a group of renowned COIN experts. I am not sure if the others helped develop this manual for the military, but their forewords are just as interesting. For the content of the manual it will soon become the bible of COIN warfare/operations, it is by far the most detailed manual on the subject. It covers theories, tactics, techniques and procedures as used by various countries from various conflicts and lays these methods out within the current U.S. military context. This book is not meant to be specific to the Iraq or Afghanistan insurgency but is meant to be a "tool bag" of methods and ideas to be adapted to various conflicts. Finally the manual was reformatted in to an oversized handbook with a laminate type card cover with rounded corners that make it perfect to slip into a kit bag or rucksack. This is a must own for all soldiers (E1 and up!), politicians and concerned citizens.
Great resource! July 24, 2007
C. Cline (Baghdad, Iraq)
18 out of 24 found this review helpful
If you are deploying or studying modern warfare in any capacity, this book is a MUST! The fowards alone are the perfect description of today's combat operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic. I may not completely agree with Sarah Sewall on everything, but she's dead on in her introduction.
Deploying units, especially those officers who are acting as the BN S5 or BDE S9 (CMO) MUST know this book cover to cover.
Don't leave home without it!
Interesting and important work on counterinsurgency August 29, 2007
Steven A. Peterson (Hershey, PA (Born in Kewanee, IL))
16 out of 19 found this review helpful
The context for this important work (John Nagl's Foreword, Page xiii): ". . .the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it." In the "Introduction," Sarah Sewall observes the critical point of counterinsurgency (COIN) (Page xxiii):
". . .although it is military doctrine, the field manual emphasizes the multiple dimensions of COIN: `those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.'" Traditional US COIN policy was unwisely military only--ignoring the many other dimensions.
Obviously, one of the most arresting features of this volume is one of its authors--General David Petraeus. At the outset, this book emphasizes the competitive learning struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent. The manual says that (Page lii) ". . .the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly--the better learning organization--usually wins."
The first chapter explores insurgency and counterinsurgency, concluding with a series of lessons for governments as they "take on" an insurgency. Page 51 features a Table outlining successful operational practices (e.g., emphasize intelligence, isolate insurgents from the population, protect key infrastructure, provide amnesty for those willing to support the new government) and those that are not normally successful (e.g., overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy as opposed to engaging the populace as a whole, ignore peacetime processes, including legal procedures). The first chapter also features a number of pithy points that might seem counterintuitive (e.g., "if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week"; "sometime doing nothing is the best reaction").
Other key chapters focus on the need to have unity between civilian and military activities (counterinsurgency fails if it is carried out as a military approach only), the requirement for good intelligence, leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency.
Some of the more interesting aspects of this book are located in the several appendices. One focuses on the support of linguists in COIN; intriguing, too, is a section on legal considerations in COIN.
For some readers, this might be uncomfortable reading, given its focus on warfare. On the other hand, COIN is a reality and a method for combating insurgencies. The book is pretty well written; for the most part, it is also clearly written. It is fascinating to see the author rise in the ranks, partly as a result of his perspective as laid out in this work.
Clarity, and reasonable distinctions August 31, 2007
Jeffrey B. Gill (Granville, Ohio)
9 out of 10 found this review helpful
Gen. Petraeus is a smart man, and a wise soldier; the most reassuring thing about reading this book and knowing he's in charge right now in Iraq is that this work shows he knows the limits of armed power, and right where those boundaries are. He doesn't try to say a 19 year old with a gun can solve everything, or that a Ranger trained sergeant can do whatever is called for -- but they can do certain things very well that have to be resolved before the suits and shovels can be deployed. Petraeus may not have written the whole thing, but knowing he was integrally involved with the text and uses it with his command and control structures is the most reassuring thing i've heard about Iraq in years.
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