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Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power | 
 enlarge | Author: Fred Kaplan
Publisher: Wiley
Category: Book
List Price: $25.95
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Rating:  78 reviews
Sales Rank: 123003
Media: Hardcover
Pages: 256
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.9
Dimensions (in): 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.1
ISBN: 0470121181
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.73
EAN: 9780470121184
ASIN: 0470121181
Publication Date: January 29, 2008
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Product Description
America's power is in decline, its allies alienated, its soldiers trapped in a war that even generals regard as unwinnable. What has happened these past few years is well known. Why it happened continues to puzzle. Celebrated Slate columnist Fred Kaplan explains the grave misconceptions that enabled George W. Bush and his aides to get so far off track, and traces the genesis and evolution of these ideas from the era of Nixon through Reagan to the present day.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 73 more reviews...
Well written critique of current American policy February 9, 2008
Steven A. Peterson (Hershey, PA (Born in Kewanee, IL))
46 out of 48 found this review helpful
The point of this book is illustrated by a handful of quotations at the outset. From T. E. Lawrence (Of Arabia): "All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity. But the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible." And a couple quotations from author Fred Kaplan. Page 1: "Nearly all of America's blunders in war and peace these past few years stem from a single grand misconception: that the world changed after September 11, when in fact it didn't." And (Pages 1-2): "But in fact, the end of the Cold War made America weaker, less capable of exerting its will on others. And its leaders' failure to recognize this, their inclination to devise policies based on the premise of omnipotence, made America weaker still."
This is a pretty well-written book. Its impact is diminished to some extent because others have raised many of the same points. The blindness to what would happen after the Iraqi invasion by American troops and their allies by Rumsfeld and others has been dissected many times and in many other books.
The discussion of the history of trying to develop an anti-ballistic missile system, quite fairly, traces the idea back to its early beginnings under President Eisenhower (I must confess that I am getting numbed by many books that focus just on the Bush II Administration, whether positively or negatively, without considering historical context). The theme raised by the author is that experts from start to now have noted that the system is not likely to work; there are too many ways that an aggressor can confound the system. The author also notes that military officials tend to "cook" results by structuring tests so as to increase odds of success. Kaplan laments the national treasure that has gone into the research and deployment of experiments/systems.
While Kaplan does not want a return to the cold-blooded (in his eyes) Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, he also decries the idealist vision of foreign policy of President Bush and the neocons. He wants a return to a more modest realism (small r as opposed to large R realism of Kissinger).
He ends by intentionally ironically quoting George W. Bush in a televised debate with Al Gore back in 2000. Bush said (Page 200): "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. . .If we're a humble nation but strong, they'll welcome us." With that ironic twist from the author's pen, the book closes.
For those who have read a lot about these issues, the book won't illuminate much in addition to what one already knows. Opponents of Bush are apt to seize on the book as further ammunition; proponents of the President are likely to take the opposite tack.
From my reading, this is another piece that adds to the discussion of the events of the past several years. It is well written and one can read it quickly. Not much that hasn't been said before, in terms of events. The conclusion advocating a return to "sensible realism" makes a certain sense, but the argument has been made with much greater depth and sophistication by a number of analysts (e.g., see Charles Kupchan's "The End of the American Era" or Joseph Nye's "The Paradox of American Power"). So, a book that will get you thinking about the issues one way or another if you haven't already made up your mind.
A plea for reality in foreign policy November 24, 2007
Smallchief
35 out of 39 found this review helpful
Kaplan has written a dispassionate, persuasive book about the complete, total, absolute, across the board and without exception failure of George Bush's foreign policy. Moreover the learning curve of this Administration has been nearly flat on the axis of zero.
Kaplan explains that Bush came to power at the head of a group of transformation theorists who set out to remedy the failings of past Presidents with a policy of confronting America's enemies with military muscle. Kaplan takes up back to the 1950s to explain the currents of military philosphy leading up to Bush. Drawing on the development of neo-conservative philosophy, Bush and the neo-cons wanted to throw out the dirty bath water of co-existence with obnoxious regimes such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.
Unfortunately, it didn't work and Kaplan details the reasons. The principal one is that the United States did not get stronger as a result of the end of the Cold War, but rather weaker -- more dependent on other countries in a multi-polar world and less able to go it alone with a policy that most countries found obnoxious or downright evil. The end of the Cold War, Kaplan states, didn't leave America in control of the world, it left most of the world out of control of anyone.
We seem some glimmerings of hope in Kaplan's book. Condaleeza Rice occasionally shows cognizance of reality. And after six years of Bush we seem to have worked our way back to where the Clinton Administration had progressed in eliminating the nuclear threat of North Korea. Kaplan's conclusion is that you have to deal with the world as it is -- not as how you want it to be. The U.S. has influence, but it can't abandon "statecraft" and diplomacy in favor of bullying and preaching.
Smallchief
 More than meets the news January 10, 2008
calmly
18 out of 21 found this review helpful
Reading this book reminded me of how little analysis one gets from the major news outlets. I learned quite a bit from this book all of which unsettles me.
I was aware of the extent of the nuclear threats in the world as a general problem from having read Douglas Mattern's Looking for Square Two: Moving from War and Organized Violence to Global Community. But that book, although alarming in itself, didn't give me the "day by day" sense of how such threats may have seemed to our and other nations political and military leadership. That anti-ballistic efforts seemed highly unlikely to be feasible doesn't seem surprising: what does seem surprising was that so much was spent to confirm that. Perhaps it is understandable in light of the lack of alternatives.
I hadn't been aware of the technological advances in the accuracy and cost of bombs that made the U.S. plans for invading Iraq seem plausible. It is appalling, however, to read (as one can see) just how unprepared the administration was for the days after "Mission Accomplished". That Germany, Japan and allies were enabled to rebuild after World War II yet the U.S. is still bogged down in "little" Iraq and spending so much seems unfathomable evidence of plans gone badly awry: this book gives good background and hypotheses as to why.
Bush appears sharper (but not sharp enough) and more engaged in decision-making than I would have expected. Unfortunately more rigid. How could he not realize that elections might be won by one's enemies, including those who would eliminate future elections if at all possible? Does he himself really believe what he spouts about freedom and democracy while all the while the U.S. has needed (and financed) the support of countries lacking in such?
After reading this book, the Bush effort to have the U.S. singlehandedly "right" the world might seem laughable if it will not be so painful for all Americans, as it already has been both painful and deadly for some. But the dangers present in the current world that any President will face comes through clearly. This is not anti-Bush propaganda but somber evidence and insights into just how challenging the world situation is at this time. Scares me to death. If anti-ballistic missiles don't offer a feasible solution and if the U.S. can't even control one other country, what possibility is there other than statesmanship? I recommend Mattern's Looking for Square Two: Moving from War and Organized Violence to Global Community because, although idealistic, it seems like its orientation toward world citizenship, however unlikely to succeed, offers more promising failures than the current approaches do.
Whatever opinions I might have crumble quickly in the light of the fast-changing and complex world scenarios that Kaplan brings to life. Not a time for the uninformed or the naive. It can't be easy President or any adviser to one. But let's hope someone can do it much better...somehow having the good judgment and values to know what that "much better" is.
As to values, this book, with its emphasis on power, doesn't focus on that. For a good progressive presentation of values, I recommend Listen to Your Mother: Stand Up Straight: How Progressives Can Win as well as the world citizen concerns that Mattern presents.
 Babyboomers gone awry ... November 25, 2007
! Steffan Piper ! (La Quinta, CA)
15 out of 22 found this review helpful
Fred Kaplan's Daydream Believers reads darkly and insidiously like some quiet hallway whispering from some Black Project Government Agent. The back of the book stated that Kaplan was `One of Slate's most celebrated columnists' and that the book `reveals the political daydreams that have created our foreign policy nightmare.' Unfortunately, the book seems to weave a sense of weariness more than a compelling story due to the fact that Kaplan cobbled this book together from his unpublished footnotes and left-overs from a series of articles that he's been contributing to Slate Magazine since 2002.
The book opens with a history lesson on the Star Wars Defense Initiative, the Gulf War and its mis-haps concerning George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld but then disappears deep into a dull history of RAND, dumb-guided missiles and a tale of Andrew Marshall that makes him out to be a sort of Emperor-in-the-wings while Cheney slowly morphs into the all-to-obvious Darth Vadar that we've always suspected.
I would've appreciated this book a lot more if it was the cogent analysis that the writer is promising to deliver instead of a half-realized, patchwork of journalism gone awry, which reads more like it really wants to be a screenplay that Kaplan hasn't been able to sell to Hollywood yet. The build-up comes like clockwork in the last chapter where he fires the missiles at Bush, but only in a Truman Capote-like disinterested shrug, and comes across as a bit of a bounder.
The only interesting part is noting the areas where it seems whole sentences and paragraphs have been deleted by somebody just out of frame, for whatever security reasons that this book might infringe on. In several places the writing becomes truncated and separate sentences begin again, but on something new. It reminds me of all those classified documents that you might see with black high-lighter on every other line.
As a footnote, I also want to take issue with the use of annotation that Kaplan decides on. What is typical in most fact-based historical accounts is the use of numbered annotation, where statements are cited and numbered, and the reader checks this in the bibliography in the back. Kaplan decides to annotate in a barely-referenced quote style, that makes the reader hunt-and-peck like you have to spot the difference between two almost-identical paintings. It's a bit nerve-wracking when trying to fact check some of the statements made by Kaplan as you may find some of his argument specious.
But, I'm sure Kaplan will be loudly applauded for this book as it weaves the type of mystical story-telling that is ripe and quickly consumed by the "I told you so" crowd. Most of what is presented here however, reads like regurgitated, but forgotten U.S. Army War College documents that Art Bell might have on his main page.
Together with a Few Other Books, All You Need to Know March 21, 2008
Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States)
15 out of 17 found this review helpful
The author is kinder to the protagonists than they merit.
I give the author high marks for making the case early on in the book that the world did NOT change after 9-11, and that what really happened was that the coincidence of neo-conservative back-stabbing and Bush's well-intentioned evangelical village idiot view of freedom and democracy.
The author does a fine job of reviewing how after 9-11 we were faced with two choices, the first, going for empire ("we make our own reality") or revitalizing alliances. The neocons in their ignorance called for regime changes, but the author fails us here by not understanding that both political parties love 42 of the 44 dictators, those that "our" dictators.
The author has many gifted turns of phrase. One talks about how their "vision" turned into a "dream" that then met "reality" and was instantly converted into a "nightmare."
The author adds to our knowledge of how Rumsfeld empowered Andy Marshall, and how the inner circle quickly grew enamored of the delusion that they could achieve total situational awareness with total accuracy in a system of systems no intelligent person would ever believe in.
The author highlights two major intelligence failures that contributed to the policy bubble:
1. Soviet Union was way behind the US during the Cold War, not ahead.
2. Soviet economy was vastly worse and more vulnerable that CIA ever understood.
The author helps us understand that the 1989 collapse of the Berlin War created a furor over the "peace dividend" and the "end of history" that were mistaken, but sufficient to bury with noise any concerns about Bin Laden and Saudi Arabian spread of virulent anti-Shi'ite Wahabibism from 1988 onwards.
By 1997 Marshall and Andy Krepinevich were staking everything on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), high speed communications and computing (still not real today), and precision munitions.
The author provides a super discussion of Col John Warden's "five rings" in priority order: 1) leadership and C4I; 2) infrastructure; 3) transportation; 4) population (again, war crimes); and finally, 5) the enemy. The author is brutal in scoring the campaign designed by Col Warden a complete failure. It...did...not...work (in Gulf I).
I cannot summarize everything, so a few highlights:
+ Taliban quickly learned how to defeat US overhead (satellite) surveillance--remember, we do not do "no-notice" air breather imagery any more, except for easily detected UAVs, with mud as well as cover and concealment. .
+ Excellent account of the influence on Rumsfeld of George Tenet's failure to satisfy him during a missile defense review. It became obvious to all that the U.S. Intelligence Community a) no longer had a very high level of technical mastery on the topic; and b) was so fragmented as to make the varied analytic elements deaf, dumb, and blind--not sharing with each other, using contradictory data sets, the list goes on.
Page 187 is the page to read if you are just browsing in the bookstore:
Summarizing 2007: "Not so much a return to realism as a retreat to randomness." Also: "Grand vision was shattered by reality. Policies were devised piecemeal; actions were scattershot, aimless." And: "put forth ideas without strategies; policies without process; wishes without means." Devastating.
So many other notes. Here are a tiny handful:
+ Speechwriter Michael Gersen connected with Bush on an evangelical level, wrote major speeches, in the case of a foreign policy speech, without actually consulting any adult practitioners.
+ Joseph Korbel was both Madeline Albright's father and Condi Rice's educational mentor--talk about a non-partisan losing streak!
+ American Enterprise Institute and Richard Perl used Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky to impress Cheney and subvert Bush by reframing the Israeli genocide against the Palestinians as the first 21st Century war between terrorism (the hapless Palestinians) and democracy (the Israeli's).
+ He credits Eliot Abrams with devising the unique linkage between American Jews whose numbers and influence have been declining, and the Evangelical Christians whose influence peaked with Bush-Cheney.
+ He slams General Tommy Franks for providing assurances and making promises he could not keep with respect to settling and stabilizing the towns by-passed or over-run by the US Army.
+ The author is misleading in his account of the Saudi-Powell discussions on how an election would lead to radical Islamics in charge (as opposed to despotic, perverted spendthrifts).
+ Rumsfeld Lite going into Iraq meant that a quarter million tons of ordnance was looted by insurgents, which is what cost us four years time. General Shinseki is vindicated.
+ For the first time I learn of a planned Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
+ The author introduces Ahmed Chalabi but does not fully understand this man's crimes as well as his special relationship with Iran. Iran used him to get the USA to depose the Taliban and Sadaam Hussein, , and to lure the entire US military into a quagmire.
+ Department of State, Mr. White in particular, got it right every time.
+ Legitimacy and stability must come before elections.
+ Hezbollah win in Lebanon dealt a crushing blow to the Bush delusions.
+ Bush refused to deal with Syria and Iran throughout. I am reminded of how Civil Affairs was told in the first five years of the war to blow off the tribal leaders and imams, and only now are they being allowed to get it right.
+ Useful account of three failed Public Diplomacy tenures (Charlotte Beers, Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes (who waited six months so her son could leave for college--so much for the importance of that job....)
+ USA sent $230 million in aid to Lebanon, while Iran poured in $1 billion via Hezbollah (meanwhile, the Chinese do the same everywhere else).
Page 191 is glorious: Bush's strategies were "based on fantasies, faith, and a willful indifference toward those affected by their consequences."
Page 192: the real divide is "between the realists and the fantasists."
The author quite properly slams the Democrats for not having an original idea, plan, program, bill, budget, or moral thought.
He ends by suggesting that multinational consensus is still the true litmus test for the sensibility and sustainability of any endeavor.
On this note, I conclude that five stars are right where this book should be. Incomplete, but original and provocative. Bravo.
Other recommendations:
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
DVD Why We Fight
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency
The Price of Loyalty : George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy
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