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Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror | 
 enlarge | Author: Robert Young Pelton
Publisher: Three Rivers Press
Category: Book
List Price: $13.95
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Rating:  43 reviews
Sales Rank: 6936
Media: Paperback
Pages: 368
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.4
Dimensions (in): 7.9 x 5.1 x 0.9
ISBN: 1400097827
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.3540973
EAN: 9781400097821
ASIN: 1400097827
Publication Date: August 28, 2007
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Product Description
Robert Young Pelton first became aware of the phenomenon of hired guns in the War on Terror when he met a covert team of contractors on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border in the fall of 2003. Pelton soon embarked on a globe-spanning odyssey to penetrate and understand this shadowy world, ultimately delivering stunning insights into the way private soldiers are used.
Enter a blood-soaked world of South African mercenaries and tribal fighters backed by ruthless financiers. Drop into Baghdad’s Green Zone, strap on body armor, and take a daily high-speed ride with a doomed crew of security contractors who dodge car bombs and snipers just to get their charges to the airport. Share a drink in a chic hotel bar with wealthy owners of private armies who debate the best way to stay alive in war zones.
Licensed to Kill spans four continents and three years, taking us inside the CIA’s dirty wars; the brutal contractor murders in Fallujah and the Alamo-like sieges in Najaf and Al Kut; the Deep South contractor training camps where ex–Special Operations soldiers and even small town cops learn the ropes; the contractor conventions where macho attendees swap bullet-punctuated tales and discuss upcoming gigs; and the grim Central African prison where contractors turned failed mercenaries pay a steep price.
The United States has encouraged the use of the private sector in all facets of the War on Terror, placing contractors outside the bounds of functional legal constraints. With the shocking clarity that can come only from firsthand observation, Licensed to Kill painstakingly deconstructs the most controversial events and introduces the pivotal players. Most disturbingly, it shows that there are indeed thousands of contractors—with hundreds more being produced every month—who’ve been given a license to kill, their services available to the highest bidder.
From the Hardcover edition.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 38 more reviews...
 THE Reference on Private Military Contractors and Those Who Hire or Fear Them August 29, 2006
Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States)
115 out of 134 found this review helpful
I was the guy that did the threat study that put private military contractors on the official targeting list for the US Government, establishing them as legitimate targets who needed to be understood by all available (secret and open) means as either belligerents or at least relevant actors in any situation.
Robert Young Pelton, whom I know personally and admire as one of the most honest, courageous, and mature investigative journalists and adventurers (see my review of his Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places: 5th Edition (Robert Young Pelton the World's Most Dangerous Places), is without question the best reporter and observer in the world of the "dogs of war." He ranks up with and above Robert Kaplan, Seymour Hersh, and John Fialka, three intrepid and intellectual reporters who help define the extraordinary talents and veracity of this author, Robert Young Pelton.
When I received his book I dropped everything and offer here a few of the highlights:
He distinguishes carefully between Mercenaries (soldiers for hire) and Private Military Contractors (PMC) who are security for hire.
Blackwater, the best of the (PMC can train 35,000 men in a year, and delivers a lighter, faster, smaller (and more effective) security force than the U.S. Army.
He recounts the history of CIA money into Special Operations Forces (SOF) black operations, which in turn created PMCs. Just as CIA funded the jihad in Afghanistan, so also has it funded--perhaps ignorantly in both cases--the emergence of the PMCs.
Telling early story: before 9/11, lawyers reduced CIA and other action elements of the US Government to wimpy toast. It took 9/11 to frost the lawyers and unleash the real men in the USG and elsewhere.
EDIT: Prior to 9/11, the lawyers were piss-ants such as those who advised the ABLE DANGER team to destroy evidence discovered pre 9-11 of two hijackers, instead of turning it over to the FBI. CIA lawyers, with a couple of exceptions, are also piss-ants. Real men include the guys that went into Afghanistan (see my reviews of Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander and First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan), and the guys at US Special Operations Command who are on their own all over the world. I never imagined that NSA and CIA would simply turn the lawyers off and violate ALL of our civil liberties, including warrantless wiretapping and rendition (kidnapping to export for torture) and the denial of habeas corpus to US and UK and Australian citizens, among others.
His overall account makes it clear that the new breed of PMC warrior is better in all respects (stronger, faster, smarter, better shot, more tech savvy) than the past SOF heroes, but FAILS in one important respect: tactical combat decision-making. He explains that communications has robbed the field men of all initiative, and they are now nothing more than risk takers for fat-assed pasty-faced Rear Echelon Mother Fryers (REMF) with too much rank, too much air conditioning, and not enough character to make it in the field.
This book will be, for some time, the basic reference for those who wish to be PMCs, manage PMCs, or employ PMC companies. On the one hand, he documents the rates and the profits ($500 a day per man, billed at $1500 a day per man, with $500 for overhead and $500 for profit PER DAY), but he also points out that at 24/7 ops tempo, this can come out to $25 an hour, or worse. He points out that SOF and other skilled uniformed professionals earn $50K a year, while PMCs can earn $200K a year--the contrast explains why SOF is hemorrhaging personnel. He discussed the 90 days on, 30 days off, but also notes that a third of the candidates do not make the grade in training, while half of those who are sent to the field do not make the grade under combat conditions and are Ordered Home.
In passing he notes that CIA tends to stink at local level relations, throwing money at locals to get intelligence, which is consequently generally bad and useless.
He also warns those who receive USG funded PMCs that as was the case in Haiti, the withdrawal of US funding for PMC security can be capricious and sudden.
He related the rise of the PMC to the political desire in the US of limiting the uniformed head counts in combat conditions, and this in turn not only supports PMCs with guns instead of uniformed military with guns, but also turning over all logistics to PMCs, some of which are unrealizable (and thus leave our troops without water and food and shower points in the clinch).
The book adds further to the documented view of Paul Bremer as a dictator no better than Saddam Hussein (who at least provided electricity and water and stability).
This thoughtful study notes that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) have not been well developed for PMCs, and that the seam between PMCs and the US military and the US Department of State are thoroughly screwed up to non-existent.
He notes that in addition to Iraqi disdain for Paul Bremer, there is acute Iraqi consciousness for the fact that in Iraq, PMCs are the top of the food chain and have everything, including jobs, which Iraqis have not received in the so-called "peace."
This author and this book SMASHES both the Rolling Stone article on "Heavy Metal Mercenaries" and the self-promoting and largely false book The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger.
Passing comments document the different "tribes" in the PMC world, the fact that many PMCs are paying their US citizens with offshore accounts that evade taxes, that laptops not guns are the focus for many individuals (their lifeline to family and reality), that London is the center of gravity for PMC activity, that over 400 PMCs have been killed in Iraq (contract this with 2,500 from US military), and that the bottom line for PMCs is that they are largely ethical, moral, professional, and committed.
I especially liked the author's closing contrast between the British PMC model "it's about minimum force, Old Boy" and the US model, "high tech max force" approach.
Immortal quote on page 227: "The post 9/11 world opened up a Pandora's box of prospects for adventurers, conmen, and opportunists...."
I will end with three points the author brings out:
1) PMC Blackwater is smart, focused on the bomb makers not the bomb deliverers.
2) Everybody is making money in Iraq (that is a US citizen) EXCEPT the US uniformed soldiers actually fighting the war.
3) PMCs are, like guns, something that can be used for good or bad.
Robert Young Pelton is extraordinary, and this book is the cutting edge of reality: PMCs. He is unique for his preparation and for walking in the PMC shoes.
Educational and intriguing look into PSC's December 27, 2006
Kevin Lynds (San Diego, Ca USA)
40 out of 42 found this review helpful
RYP's book on the modern history of PSC's offers what appears to be an honest look into the world of today's military contractor, or what some would call "mercenary". Much of the book covers the work of PSC's in Iraq today and gives an honest look into what the job entails. The daily hurry-up and wait game, the same routine day in and day out, with short bursts on intense violence and excitement and the ever-present knowledge that the enemy is everyewhere and can be everyone (or anything - IED's).
Mr. Pelton seems to gain a lot of access to not only the personalities of those running today's security companies, but those that ran and operated in past ones, such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes. Some of their (the owners and the operators) motivations are laid out in the open, some are percieved and some are questioned. For example, the US contractors that work in Iraq mostly seem to be family men, trained in the military, that have no other job experience or training and who "saw the light" in making military wages or go private and make upwards of $10k p/month. Now although their main motivation seems to be money and might classify them as a "mercenary force", you do not get the idea that they are for hire to the highest bidder. They are doing what they were trained to do, working for the goals of the US, just making more money. There are also those who seemto like the money and excitement of the job. RYP also covers the effects of the Blackwater contractors who were ambushed, mutilated, killed and hung from a bridge on the industry. He is able to give an objeective and honest look into both the worlds of private military companies, those that are working "above board" as security specialists and those who have taken of on more a mercenary role in world affairs.
His book raises many questions and issues, some raised by the contractors themselves. One being the genocide in Darfur. Eric Prince, founder of Blackwater says he can field a military force to go in and deal with the atrocities happening in Sudan, and that he can do it faster and for pennies on the dollar of what it would cost the mostly-inept UN to do it. Obviously many questions arise, but as we debate, innocent people are having their houses burned down, while being raped, mutilated and killed by the Janjaweed. What is our (the worlds) excuse to these people on why we seem to be sitting on our hands. As one contractor said, give them the word and it they would be "Janja-weed-Be-Gone".
The biggest question raised is one that is not answered in the book and one that only time will tell. As this private military complex becomes more popular with more companies popping up worldwide, at what cost will that have to our nation and military. Although Eric Prince says that his Blackwater firm will not take on any job that is not in accordance with the security of the US, what will happen as more and more trained professionals (both inside and outside of the us) that do not have his same patriotism are pulled out into the world market by the almighty dollar, no matter the side?
 License to Kill January 20, 2007
Rusty Graham (Peoria, Illinois USA)
24 out of 52 found this review helpful
After reading this book I'm not sure what he was trying to do? He really does not provide a day to day view of the contracters. He seems to globe trot through 20 years of PMC's that point at how dangerous this industry is to the world. Yet all he provides is a few people that have given it a black eye. He has an entire chapter on a guy named Idema who is not even a PMC!!! Yet he uses him as a point to show how dangerous this industry is. One of the first few chapters goes into the authors version of how the evil Bush and his inner circle suckered america into this war. After a couple pages I just skipped this chapter cause I wanted to read about PMCs!!! He goes into detail to show that most PMCs are hired by people who's only interest is for economic reasons. I guess he hasn't studied US military history since the war of 1812? Cause just about every war the US has been in had roots in economics. Then when some Blackwater contracters and one marine are surrounded and engaging the enemy. Pelton focuses on the fact that a PMC was giving orders to a marine! How dangerous it is for a civilian to be ordering around military troops in a combat zone!!! ewwww aahhh... The order was for him to open fire cause the enemy was going to over run their building and kill them! hahahaa The best thing I can say about the author is he did travel around the world and interview a lot of people. He went to locations that are very dangerous. But if you want to read a book about PMCs then pick up A Bloody Business. Gives alot more detail and specifics of the industry and what these people do on a daily bases in Iraq. Unless you want an overview on how paid armed civilians in a combat zone is a threat to the world. Then read License to Kill.
The Dark Side January 20, 2007
~~~~ (Los Angeles, CA)
20 out of 24 found this review helpful
Robert reveals the booming world of security contractors in a concise and exploratory way that leaves the reader wondering why the rest of the journalistic world turns a blind eye to this phenomenon that is, or will be affecting all of us. He presents all the players from various angles but in a first-person sense - not someone who just spent time prowling the web, but actually is in the field living and breathing with the characters he reports on.
Incredibly revealing and highly detailed in research this book should be required reading for anyone trying to get a handle on the current "War on Terror" tactics and the brave new world unfolding from these policies.
Entertaining, but deeply flawed. August 30, 2006
James Mone (Los Angeles, CA United States)
19 out of 34 found this review helpful
I bought this book yesterday evening, a little over 12 hours ago - and was able to burn through 350 pages in very little time. That is a testament to how entertaining the subject matter is. For that - I gave it an additional star.
It is an at times fascinating book - with some real insights to the dark underbelly of private security contractors. Other times it reads like an issue of Soldier of Fortune, and that is not a compliment.
There is a blustery, conceit about some passages and events where the author inserts himself as a central figure without adding anything to the story. To me good journalistic writing brings the story to you as if you were there. Michael Moorer, Geraldo Rivera - they are the kind of 'journalists' where the story is just as much about them as it is about whatever the subject matter is - I think this book veers off into that territory at times.
Along that vein, the many quotations from anonymous or vague sources ring loudly of convenience. They often stretch on for more than a paragraph, with strikingly similar style and message to the narrative.
In conclusion, I did find the book entertaining - but it I think the writing style, and some of the facts are a bit dubious. There are some pretty stunning revelations in this book - if you are going to make them, you owe it to your readers to cite your sources.
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