Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Oren presents the history from a military, diplomatic, political and cultural perspective. Through the extensive examination of archives, official reports, memoirs and interviews with surviving figures, Oren details the roles played by all the major players from the perspective of, not just the Israelis but the Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians as well as the United States and the Soviet Union.

After beginning by presenting a brief synopsis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that point, Oren describes the series of miscalculations by Nasser that led Egypt into war several years before he intended. A combination of Syrian bellicosity, support of Palestinian terrorist incursions in Northern Israel together with the goading of his unstable general Amer, led Nasser to force the United Nations out of the de-militarized Sinai and to illegally close the Tiran straits to Israeli shipping, tantamount to a declaration of war. As Oren clearly shows, war with Egypt was inevitable the moment the straits were closed. No sovereign nation could ignore a blockade of its shipping.

Oren chronicles Israel's political struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union to permit an appropriate military response to Egypt's provocations.. Despite the clear act of war by Egypt, the Johnson administration, hobbled by Vietnam and fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets, urged Israel to show restraint. Oren describes the agony of Eskhol and the Israeli government in deciding how to attack preemptively without alienating the United States. In the famous meeting between Abba Eban and President Johnson, Johnson practically urged Israel to absorb a first strike. The execrable Charles De Gaulle did overtly demand this. Israeli military doctrine required the preemptive destruction of the enemy air forces. The tension drove Rabin to a temporary breakdown and probably took years off Eskhol's life.

Once the war started with Israel's lightning strike on the Egyptian Air Force, Oren shows how events followed their own trajectory with Jordan drawn in and then Syria and Israel's military objectives changing on a constant basis. Indeed, what becomes clear is that Israel never had any particular political objective other than the elimination of the direct existential threat. Contrary to anti-Israel revisionists, Israel never had any specific designs on the West Bank or even the old city of Jerusalem. Ironically, the decision to conquer the old city of Jerusalem was not made until he last possible moment, even after much of the West Bank was already in Israeli hands.

From the Arab perspective, Oren shows just how and why the war turned into a disaster. The Egyptian forces lacked any semblance of unified command or communications. Nasser's officers were afraid to tell him the truth. While her forces were in full retreat, her air force lying in ruins, Egypt continued to broadcast the basest propaganda that her forces were advancing towards Tel a Viv. Hussein, meanwhile, was trapped by his fear of Nasser and the Syrian radicals into attacking Israel in Jerusalem.

Also fascinating is the extent to which political and diplomatic considerations played a role in military strategy and increased Israeli casualties. For example, Eskhol delayed for so long the decision to take the Golan heights, that the IDF was unable to take the proper preparatory steps which would have included artillery bombardments, air bombings and a night time attack. Instead the brave soldiers of the IDF advanced straight into murderous Syrian fire. This was true for the Jerusalem campaign as well.

Ultimately, the value of this book is that it shows the context of the war. It is easy for revisionists to argue that Israel's conquests of the Golan and the West Bank were not necessary. What Oren shows is that, with the exception of Jerusalem, the Israeli offensives were not for the purpose of expanding Israel's territory but purely for geo-political diplomatic purposes. Once forced to fight, Israel was determined not to be forced to remain within indefensible cease fire lines as she was in 1948. There is no question that Israel's basic war aims were to eliminate the offensive capabilities of the enemies on her border and to force them to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the nature of these regimes made a peaceful solution impossible and more bloodletting would be required.

Oren contrasts the totalitarian Egyptian and Syrian regimes with the raucous Israeli democracy where decisions on basic war strategy were taken by consensus in the famous "pit". Oren makes a point of noting that, despite the general's dismay and outright disgust at Eskhol's restraint (borne of his fear of antagonizing the Soviets and the Americans), never for one moment did they consider disregarding his orders. The hallmark of a true democracy is the subordination of the military to civilian command. Nasser, by contrast, was in constant fear of military overthrow.

Oren's dispassionate analysis reveals the positive and negative roles played by the major players in the drama. The Mercurial Moshe Dyan does not come across as positively as his reputation would suggest. His inscrutable nature would endanger Israel in 1973. Eskhol is fully exonerated. Indeed, when the full story is revealed, it is difficult to think of another Israeli political figure better suited to deal with the myriad of competing considerations. Nasser comes across as more deluded and broken than evil. Hussein appears to be a victim of forces beyond his control. The Soviets are revealed in all their villainy. This book is destined to be a true classic. It will be to the Six Day War what "O Jerusalem" is to the War for Independence. It is a must read for anyone interested in the history of Israel.


If You Have Time for Only One Book on the Middle East   May 28, 2002
87 out of 92 found this review helpful

If you have time for only one book on the Middle East, purchase this book. Much of the current dispute is a result of the events of the 6 Day War. Mr. Oren's work incudes over 80 pages of footnotes, many referencing recently declassified files and personal interviews with the key players.

Although packed with information, the book is well edited and a relatively easy read - managing to build suspense although the outcome is well known.

No one emerges as a complete hero or a complete villian in Mr. Oren's gripping narrative - a tribute to the balanced, objective nature of the work.

After reading this book, the reader will never view current developments in the Middle East in the same light.


everything you want to know about the 6 day war and more   May 14, 2002
68 out of 89 found this review helpful

this is one of the finest book written about any war. not only does it cover in fascinating detail the actual battles of the war, but the circumstances that led up to this war, the diplomat intrigue before, during and after the war and what were the consequences of the conflict.

this book reads like the best war fiction written, but it's all true.

absolutely worthy of a read


Best Book on Modern Middle East - Better than Clancy Tales   June 11, 2002
Mark D Burgh (Fort Smith, AR United States)
68 out of 77 found this review helpful

Michael Oren's book is a gripping account of the Six-Day War, one that is clear from his extensive research, no one wanted. Oren shows the complex issues that moved the Egypt and Israel into a deadly tragedy. Putting the Six-Day War into his vast Cold War context illuminates the impotence of the Superpowers, the incompetence of Egypt and Syria, and the dangerous gamble Israel took when launching its necessary strike.

Oren gives us as many perspectives as he can; American, Russian, Israeli, Eqyptian, Jordanian, English participants all have their say. The brilliance of this book is not just Oren's gripping account of the war, but his making the reader understand the incredible pressure that Nasser, King Hussein, and Levi Eshkol were under. This book made me feel some sympathy for the Egyptians, poorly-led, sacrificed to Nasser's macho posturing and cronyism, to Cold war cant, and massive poverty.

What is chilling about this book is that nearly forty years later, not much has changed, as Oren points out.

Readers of Tom Clancy will find real people and real tragedy more gripping than fake heroics; no heros here, just survivors.


Written with an Israeli apologist stance   July 26, 2002
41 out of 118 found this review helpful

Oren has done a great deal of research for this book, but the flaws involve his obvious reasoning geared at justifying the war that Israel launched and called a "pre-emptive strike." Like most apologists who reason that Israel had to attack her neighbors for the 2nd time (1956 was the first time), the blame for the causes of the war are laid upon the aggressive rhetoric of the Arab states which makes about as much sense as blaming Russia for being invaded by Napoleon. The point of view is mainly an Israeli one and that saps any semblance of balance. Oren focuses upon the Israeli concerns of security, real or imagined prior to the war and then focuses upon the war itself for most of the book. This book reads like an official Israeli rundown of how they viewed the 1967 war or, more likely, would like the world to view the war. For example, Oren focuses upon the Arab states negative and hostile views of Israel following the 1948 conflict, but writes little about Israeli views (especially avoiding anything negative). No mention of Ben-Gurion's preference for the tenuous armistice of 1949 so that he too could keep the option of war open. This is a running theme in this book. The Arabs are the ones clamoring for war and the Israeli transgressions are largely ignored. The background events to the war focus upon the hawkish actions and rhetoric of the Arab states, while again saying very little about the Israeli side. Were there no Israelis looking to take Gaza and the West Bank to complete Eretz Israel as Ben-Gurion and Menechem Begin claimed was the ultimate Zionist goal? Reading this book you'll never know. Why were the Palestinians hostile to Israel aside from the obvious reasons? Like today's headlines in most American media outlets, Oren's weakness is that he only discusses the events and not the root causes. The negative aspects of the Arab states are discussed in great detail, while nothing is expressed about the various factions in Israel and Oren continuously expresses his very un-academic admiration of Israel and expresses obvious bias. The root cause of Israel's ignoring of the Palestinian refugees was and is a major reason for the hostility of the Palestinians and is given perfunctory mention by Oren, while every raid and attack and the birth of the PLO are given some mention. It's apologetic to the Israeli POV while using an academic style that is detailed yet also judgmental and unbalanced.

The book focuses upon all the major events of the 6-Day War in great deal, but the lack of objectivity saps the effort. At the very least, Oren COULD have discussed the perceptions of both sides and the hawks that clamored for war on both sides, but instead we get a rundown of Arab rhetoric which realists like Nasser never meant to be taken literally. Oren also does not discuss very extensively the bad Israeli intelligence that failed to assess the fact that the Egyptian formations in the Sinai were defensive (the words of Yitzhak Rabin as quoted in Le Monde). Instead we get a rundown of the threat from the Arab states such as the token troops sent by Iraq to Jordan which were purely symbolic rather than any practical military threat. The strength of this book lies in the details of the 1967 war, which can be gleaned from other books minus the blatantly pro-Israeli bent. The Israeli victory was rapid and surprised even the Israelis (again proving how bad Israeli intelligence was at this time) and the details of the conflict are the one redeeming quality of this book. This is not the best resource to learn about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or the Six Day War unless you balance it out by reading something like "Bitter Harvest" by Sami Hadawi which presents the Palestinian POV or the more neutral "Righteous Victims" which goes over the same events that led up the Six Day War and the details of the war itself that Oren presents, but also discusses what was going in the minds of Israeli leaders and the bad intelligence of the Israelis.