| Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia |  | Author: Ahmed Rashid
Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Category: Book
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Rating:  58 reviews
Sales Rank: 4,076
Media: Paperback
Edition: Revised
Pages: 560
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.1
Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.4 x 1.3
ISBN: 014311557X
Dewey Decimal Number: 954.053
EAN: 9780143115571
ASIN: 014311557X
Publication Date: April 7, 2009
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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| Features:
| | ISBN13: 9780143115571 | | | Condition: NEW | | | Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark. |
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| Also Available In:
| | Hardcover - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia | | | Hardcover - Nation Building | | | Audio Cassette - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia | | | Audio CD - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia | | | Audio Download - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building (Unabridged) | | | Audio CD - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia | | | MP3 CD - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia | | | Preloaded Digital Audio Player - Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (Playaway Adult Nonfiction) | | | Kindle Edition - Descent into Chaos | | | Audio CD - Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia |
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Product Description
After September 11th , Ahmed Rashid's crucial book Taliban introduced American readers to that now notorious regime. In this new work, he returns to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia to review the catastrophic aftermath of America's failed war on terror. Called "Pakistan's best and bravest reporter" by Christopher Hitchens, Rashid has shown himself to be a voice of reason amid the chaos of present-day Central Asia. Descent Into Chaos is his blistering critique of American policy-a dire warning and an impassioned call to correct these disasterous strategies before these failing states threaten global stability and bring devastation to our world.
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| Customer Reviews:
Showing reviews 1-5 of 58
 A deeply troubling book July 11, 2008
Ralph Blumenau (London United Kingdom)
104 out of 108 found this review helpful
Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; and if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first published in 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurking in that area.
After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces and to Pakistan while the Soviets were in Afghanistan; then a total lack of interest in the period after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when Afghanistan was first torn apart by competing war-lords and was then overrun by the Taliban.
No longer in need of Pakistan, the USA then imposed sanctions on that country because it, like India, had carried out tests of nuclear weapons.
The next 15 chapters are essentially a sequel to the author's Taliban, and chronicles in great and sometimes in dense detail, right up to early 2008, the story of Afghanistan and Pakistan after the expulsion of the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim President. The victory had been not only been swift (it took two months), but had also been cheap for the Americans. They had fought the campaign from the air, leaving the land fighting to the war-lords of the Northern Alliance. The Americans lost just one man killed. Karzai was installed as interim president. This easy victory led the Americans to believe that it could be copied in Iraq, an attack on which the neo-cons had planned even before the Afghan war. Once the Iraq war began, the Americans concentrated on that and paid much less attention to Afghanistan, on which they wanted to spend as little money as possible. Rumsfeld was explicitly not interested in `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure..
From this all sorts of mistakes arose:
1. It seemed easier to use the armies of the war-lords than to build and train an Afghan National Army.
2. Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik and Uzbek war-lords. They refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other; they collected tolls which they refused to hand over to the government; and they alienated the Pashtun majority. For a long time Karzai dared not confront them. When eventually he managed to form a new government without them in 2004, he proved indecisive in implementing a programme of reform.
3. He was unwilling to stamp out the cultivation of opium and the drug-lords, one of whom was his own brother. Drug dealing corrupted the entire administration and the police. The Allies did not provide money for planting alternative crops and would not allow their armies to interdict the drug trade for fear of alienating the tens of thousands of farmers who depended on it.
4. The worst problem is Pakistan. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda forces, as well as the fleeing Taliban found sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These were already home to what would become the Pakistani Taliban, who helped them to rebuild their forces and joined them in incursions back into Afghanistan.
For a long time the Americans were not interested in the Taliban and did not take it seriously; but they did want Al-Qaeda people handed over, and for this they needed Musharraf's help. Musharraf did this (if he could find them!), and in return sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. For a long time the Americans did not realize the close connections that had been built up between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But Musharraf, the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the intelligence service) protected the Taliban and gave it much covert help and even direction. This was largely because they saw Karzai as a potential ally of India. Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the British to pressurize Pakistan to give up supporting the Taliban; but these found the alliance with Pakistan too important, and pretended to believe Musharraf's denials, aided, as these were, by the ISI very occasionally giving them information about the whereabouts of Taliban leaders.
But while this was just enough to appease the Allies, it was also enough to enrage the more extreme sections of the Taliban, who in any case were egged on by their al-Qaeda allies to attack Musharraf and his police as American lackeys. Musharraf emerges from this book as being as devious as he is foolish.
5. When the Americans focussed on Iraq, NATO took over as the Western instrument in Afghanistan. But each of the 37 countries which provided troops drew up its own rules about what these troops could - or more importantly: could not - do. Some confined them to reconstruction and humanitarian work; some were specifically prohibited for fighting the Taliban; some were not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationed in the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - and always insufficiently numerous - troops in the south. Of the 45,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan in 2006, only 15,000 were available for fighting. In the absence of a unified command, it is not surprising that the Taliban began to reestablish itself in large areas of the East and South from 2003 onwards and have been gaining in strength ever since.
There is much more in this troubling book - for example a comparatively brief account of the danger of al-Qaeda and other Islamic organizations establishing themselves in Uzbekistan and the other secular Central Asian republics, where tyrannical and corrupt governments are propped up by the Americans simply because these, too, suppress Islamic (along with all other) groups.
A very important work June 7, 2008
Seth J. Frantzman (Jerusalem, Israel)
44 out of 53 found this review helpful
This timely and critical book gives and experts overview of the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan and should serve as a wake uo call for policy makers interested in the region and people interested in the threat that instability and renewed Islamism pose. Here we are walked through the current unending war in Afghanistan and given a tour of the history of the American relationship with Pakistan before the author plunges into the nitty gritty of what is taking place. The book examines both the opium crop in Afghanistan and the renewel of the Taliban and their offensives against coalition and government troops. We are given an account of the rise of Islamism and the endurance of Al Quiada in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan and the coming apart of the Musharreff consensus in the wake of the death of Bhutto.
As a last vignette we are taken to Uzbekistan where the author asks 'who lost this country?' In fact this last part is where 'central asia' comes into play but it should have been beefed up. Instead of one chapter detaling the problems in Uzbekistan the book should have included discussions of the rest of 'Central Asia' which appears in the subtitle. What of Kyrgizistan and Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and the threats that might emerge from them?
The other subtitle is the question of 'nation-building' and here we are asked to consider the 'failure' of American arms, diplomacy and money. In Pakistan it is not a question so much of failure but rather of the inability of the U.S to invade the parts of that country which have been taken over by Al Quaida. In fact Pakistan is failing not only in the NWFP tribal areas but also in Baluchistan. Afghanistan, once a success, is being overun and the opium crop is funding the thugs turned drug barons turned Islamists. A short chapter on the nuclear issue also details some of the threats from increased instability or the fall of Pakistan.
An important and well written work.
Seth J. Frantzman
 An expert view of an important subject June 19, 2008
Future Watch Writer (Washington, D.C. Area)
61 out of 76 found this review helpful
The author of this book is based in Pakistan and is one of the leading journalists in the world covering Pakistan and Afghanistan. You may not agree with everything he says but you should pay close attention because he has sources throughout the region. One of his main points is that America has failed miserably at becoming informed about local realities and is trying to impose a vague concept of a "war on terror" on long term regional political realities that are far more complex. For example, how many Americans understand that the "border" between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the "Durand Line" an absurd creation of British imperialism. This left a good part of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan instead of Afghanistan. You might also want to read Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, the author's excellent history of the Taliban. Another good book is Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan
America needs a greater sense of humility in dealing with Central Asia. Afghanistan is one of the oldest places in the world. Alexander the Great campaigned in Afghanistan. There is good military history of the place called Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban I have more books in my Listmania list on Central Asia for those who are interested.
Informative and Biased July 15, 2009
Daniel Raphael
10 out of 10 found this review helpful
To put into perspective the information in this useful book, it is necessary to keep in mind the viewpoint of the author. He is usually described as a journalist, Pakistani by birth, and one whose writing can be regularly viewed in periodicals such as Foreign Affairs. He is a supporter of the Western mission of nation-building, which appears to this reviewer as the contemporary version of "the white man's burden" to bring civilization to the savages. Accordingly, he is enthusiastic about military intervention in Afghanistan by foreign armies. To his credit, he realizes that military intervention alone can solve nothing. He's no fool.
This book provides a wealth of anecdotal, chronological, and analytical background showing how the US--and, to a lesser extent, its allies such as the United Kingdom--supported some of the worst abusers of human rights in the world, as part of the post-9/11 version of the Cold War. As ever, military aid and financial payoffs to people like the ruler of Uzbekistan--who boiled to death people suspected of being overly Islamic--were justified by the likes of Colin Powell as a necessary defense of the source of all civilization...the United States. To defend civilization, you support cruel tyrants. This sounds drearily familiar.
The Taliban--who are in many ways the focus of this book--are described toward the end of the text as not really belonging to any nation, as being a transnational "lumpen" group. The question this raises is how, then, to distinguish between the Taliban and the admittedly very conservative farmers who constitute most of the population in not only Afghanistan, but in adjacent countries, as well. Mr. Rashid frequently lapses into saying things like "The Afghans wanted..." without ever identifying exactly from where this unitary voice emanates. This is a problem. As he acknowledges in these pages, most Afghans are illiterate, communication is spotty at best, and the standard of living is abysmal (average lifespan there is half of that in the US). So, how does he know what "the Afghan people" want, think, or feel? There hasn't been a lot of national polling there, to my awareness--and none documented in this book.
It's important to read this book with a critical eye, so that we don't repeat the same errors that have led to the current disaster of endless involvement in an Asian quagmire. Iraq is still bleeding and will get worse, now that the Western substitute for Saddam's tyranny is finally being required to reduce its grip on that nation. In Afghanistan, there is a major push by US troops and some of its allies to "pacify" that nation. Anyone familiar with the history of Afghanistan should be skeptical of this undertaking. More likely is an indefinite, years-long military struggle of limitless expense, with allied nations gradually reducing their current levels of military involvement.
Doesn't this sound familiar?
Timely but flawed July 16, 2009
Timothy J. Graczewski (Burlingame, CA United States)
14 out of 16 found this review helpful
As the Obama administration rolls-out an ambitious new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan teeters on the edge of political collapse this detailed account of recent events in "the region" by the veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid could not be more relevant. Unfortunately, it is marred by the author's biases, naïveté, and hyperbole.
Although I take issue with many points in this book, Rashid's central argument is a valid one. Namely, that the US never took Afghanistan seriously after the Soviet withdrawal and consistently underestimated the threat from both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Rashid's biggest gripe is the Bush administration's federalist "warlord strategy" for initially stabilizing Afghanistan and the lack of meaningful nation building efforts since 2001, especially after the invasion of Iraq. He is an unabashed proponent of building a strong central government in Kabul and stripping the regional ethnic bosses of their power, both military and political. But most of all Rashid is disappointed - almost personally offended - that his voluminous writings and recommendations for how to fix Afghanistan and Pakistan have been consistently "ignored" by the Americans, his presumably erstwhile friend Hamid Karzai, the hated Musharaff and his cronies, and, to a lesser extent, the international community. After the first few hundred pages, his whining self-promotion really starts to grate.
More surprisingly, one gets the sense that Rashid is every bit as ignorant of realities on the ground and a prisoner of his own worldview as the Bush administration neoconservatives that he attacks with such scorn and relish. Consider his take on the early days of Afghanistan invasion: "Yet this was not an occupation, and the Afghan people were literally on their knees begging for a greater international presence so that their benighted country could be rebuilt." Rashid proceeds to paint a vision of a future Afghanistan that practically amounts to Tajiks and Pashtuns grilling franks together on their backyard BBQs. He roundly condemns the US for being naïve and arrogant, and then suggests that only the US can fix a country like Afghanistan. The US could not handle Hurricane Katrina, cannot stem the flow of drugs or illegal immigrants across its borders, and cannot keep up with the rest of the industrialized world in primary education, yet we are expected to build an economy from the ground up in Afghanistan, eradicate poppy production and the heroin trade, and educate a population whose literacy rate is roughly one-in-three?
Rashid is also personally disgusted by the lack of coordination and planning between and among international aid organizations, government development agencies, and the UN, all of which has contributed to the inept civil reconstruction effort. There is no doubt that many mistakes have been made and there is plenty of waste and inefficiency in nation building projects. However, as a business executive in a company of slightly less than ten thousand employees I know all too well how difficult it is to keep different teams on the same page and not working at cross purposes - and that's in a relatively confined, secure environment. That coordination across organizations of such size and diversity is nearly impossible is a perspective that Rashid does not consider; he does not even appear to be aware of it.
Finally, Rashid writes with a flair that often dips into obvious exaggeration, which calls his many other claims into doubt. Consider this gem: "Up to twenty pickups or Toyota Land Cruisers armed with missiles and rockets that could bring down helicopter gunships would travel at 150 miles per hour across the sands." It sounds more like the script for a Ridley Scott movie. Just for the record, the top speed of a 2008 V8 Toyota Land Cruiser on a closed test track is 130 miles an hour - I checked.
In closing, it should be noted that Rashid writes that "this book is an attempt to define history in the making rather than a scholarly reappraisal years after the event." In that sense, he should be given a certain license to promote his version of events, but he takes it a bit too far, at least for this reviewer.
Showing reviews 1-5 of 58
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