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Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network | 
 enlarge | Author: Gordon Corera
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Book
List Price: $28.00
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Rating:  10 reviews
Sales Rank: 311794
Media: Hardcover
Pages: 304
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.1
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6.3 x 1.1
ISBN: 0195304950
Dewey Decimal Number: 623.45119092
EAN: 9780195304954
ASIN: 0195304950
Publication Date: September 1, 2006
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology, described by a former CIA Director as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." A hero in Pakistan and revered as the Father of the Bomb, Khan built a global clandestine network that sold the most closely guarded nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Here for the first time is the riveting inside story of the rise and fall of A.Q. Khan and his role in the devastating spread of nuclear technology over the last thirty years. Drawing on exclusive interviews with key players in Islamabad, London, and Washington, as well as with members of Khan's own network, BBC journalist Gordon Corera paints a truly unsettling picture of the ultimate arms bazaar. Corera reveals how Khan operated within a world of shadowy deals among rogue states and how his privileged position in Pakistan provided him with the protection to build his unique and deadly business empire. It explains why and how he was able to operate so freely for so many years. Brimming with revelations, the book provides new insight into Iran's nuclear ambitions and how close Tehran may be to the bomb.
In addition, the book contains startling new information on how the CIA and MI6 penetrated Khan's network, how the U.S. and UK ultimately broke Khan's ring, and how they persuaded Pakistan's President Musharraf to arrest a national hero. The book also provides the first detailed account of the high-wire dealings with Muammar Gadaffi, which led to Libya's renunciation of nuclear weapons and which played a key role in Khan's downfall.
The spread of nuclear weapons technology around the globe presents the greatest security challenge of our time. Shopping for Bombs presents a unique window into the challenges of stopping a new nuclear arms race, a race that A.Q. Khan himself did more than any other individual to promote.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 5 more reviews...
 Must Reading with Many Questions August 25, 2006
H. Campbell (houston, texas)
9 out of 14 found this review helpful
This book is a must read for any aficionado of international politics. The issue of nuclear proliferation can never again be discussed without AQ Khan's name being preeminent (though by no means exclusive.) Corera does an excellent job of presenting the facts as known in a readable fashion and mercifuilly keeps the book relatively free of jargon. But the story begs too many questions, such as how could MI6 and the CIA have ignored the red flags Khan hoisted for so long, or how could Libya's efforts to build nukes have been missed? In fact, a cynical reader will have to conclude that not even the now-well-worn excuse of recurring intelligence failures from a bungling, underequipped agency is adequate to explain these events (as if Bush's WMD fiasco was not enough to convince one that the CIA merely serves to justify political decisions.)
The ease with which Khan created his vast worldwide empire, supposedly under the noses of Musharraf and Bush and Blair, is also extremely troubling, and must lead readers to the inescapable and obvious conclusion that this occurred with tacit understandings. Money was to be made by many, until Khan outlived his usefulness. And Corera's epilogue offers no warm and fuzzy solace at Khan's arrest; as long as countries see benefits outweighing risks and "superpowers" threatening regime changes willy nilly, the temptations to keep Pandora's Box wide open will be irrestistible. Indeed, his closing statements make a good case for more nukes in more hands being a stabilizing influence, rather than allowing a few white imperialists from imposing nuclear-balced hegemony on an increasingly recalcitrant and non-white world. I suspect that statues to Khan will someday proliferate amongst Third World nations as profusely as his centrifuges have.
Praise for Shopping for Bombs August 12, 2006
Publisher (New York, NY)
6 out of 12 found this review helpful
"A page-turner." -- The Economist
"Gordon Corera has written a book you will not be able to put down. It reads like a thriller, but it is true! He has done an impressive job in researching and describing the extraordinary threat we face from nuclear weapons falling into the hands of those who wish us harm." -- Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University and author of The Power Game: A Washington Novel
"Corera's book magnificently sheds light on the activities of A.Q. Khan and rogue regimes around the world. In today's world of heightened nuclear tensions, this invaluable expose represents a must-read for both policymakers and the general public." -- Steven Emerson, author of American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us
"A superb account of how A.Q. Khan, the pioneer of nuclear black marketeering, exploited the forces of globalization and loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to provide what IAEA Secretary General, Mohamed El-Baradei, called the 'Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation'." -- Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor, J. F. K. School of Government, Harvard University
"Reads like a thriller. Corera's story, about one of the greatest threats to international security of which I am aware, is chilling and disturbing. As a former practitioner in the field, and one who has remained a close observer of issues related to nuclear proliferation, I found Shopping for Bombs a great read; it is detailed and well sourced, and full of useful insights. For anyone interested in understanding the character of the threat posed by nuclear proliferation today, it is essential reading." -- Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
"Shopping for Bombs is a clearly written and fascinating account of one of the most important episodes in the history of weapons of mass destruction--Pakistan's illicit and successful effort to build nuclear weapons and then to spread nuclear materials across the globe, an effort spearheaded by the maverick scientist A.Q. Khan. Corera has produced an even handed and absorbing history of that important story." -- Peter Bergen, fellow of the New America Foundation and author of The Osama bin Laden I Know and Holy War, Inc.
"A measured account of how a young Pakistani metallurgist named A.Q. Khan became the world's leading dealer in nuclear technology." -- Publishers Weekly
The nuclear pursuit for eternal national survival September 13, 2006
Mohamed F. El-Hewie (Hackensack, NJ USA)
5 out of 8 found this review helpful
Does the author exaggerate, take sides, or attempt to provide an accurate account?
The author is British, working for the BBC. That characterizes his style of higher accuracy and perseverance, and less inflammatory tone, than some American zealots. The author has little to gain from appealing to conservatives or liberals for future political advance. The book is well referenced, and the references are also well utilized. It is written and searched in the form of theoretical thesis on the secretive campaign of building nuclear weapons by Pakistan and Iran in the shadows of Russia, China, and North Korea.
In such theoretical context, the author has the liberty to hypothesize missing links as long as he communicates his reasoning. The author unconsciously and occasionally takes sides, especially in his empathy with the intelligence folks. For example, he claims that Barlaw's objection on the sales of F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan caused unfair termination of his job and loss to intelligence, in favor of strategic politics. The author thus dismisses the highly specialized opinion of the experts that those airplanes couldn't be altered due to their complex wiring and computer system.
The author repeats the same sympathetic stand, with Barlaw, in his arrest to a Pakistani agent pursuing the purchase of maraging steel, by dismissing the fact that Barlaw did not have definitive proof that the pursued marag steel was specifically intended for the rotors of the centrifuges. The author even exaggerates by claiming that the Pakistani agent was so dumb to admit that the steel was going to Kahuta's plant. Then there is an unexplained account of how an American convoy that visited Kahuta to explore the Khan's clandestine laboratory, could not find what they were looking for, despite traveling on land and in Jeeps in the secretive town. One ridiculous account made by the author is the arrest of one of Khan's past colleagues for carrying an oscilloscope in his luggage in a trip to Pakistan. As if the oscilloscope were a high tech military ware.
Despite the author's admission that the story is far from being totally known, he interjects many accounts to extrapolate events and fill gaps in situations where evidence lacks. The author's difficulty is apparent in realizing or recognizing the great depth of theoretical capabilities of the third world scientists. Attributing the design of the centrifuges or the bombs to the Chinese or European source is weakly supported, in view of the advances made by Khan's team in other military applications. Blue-prints of highly technical matters do not do good to someone without deep knowledge on how to compile and modify it.
The theme of the book centers on how Khan was exposed to the idea of the feasibility of accomplishing esoteric results out of radioisotope separation by gas centrifuge. It then proceeded to claim his spying and stealth of the European design of the centrifuge. That led to avoiding the Plutonium route, which is detectable, expensive, and subject to international pressure. That Khan's experience with the U235 enrichment offered Pakistan the clandestine and cheap access to fissile fuel. With the cheap and resourceful pool of scientists, Khan was able to build a prosperous laboratory, find the finance, and expand his science to other applications.
Khan's life-long pursuit for living in a country, safe from genocide, let him seek all means to accomplish his goal. His early childhood's memory of genocide, during the independence of Pakistan in 1948, had been ingrained into his psyche. The 1972's defeat of Pakistan by its old enemy renewed his traumatic memories of genocide. Hadn't lived in Holland and worked in a laboratory of centrifuges, he might have never followed the nuclear trail. Here, Khan found a parallel in the empowerment of western nations by nuclear weapon, which could fulfill his hope.
Why did Khan succeed when others failed?
1- Pakistan is country with its own language, race, limited space and population (in terms of Asian standards). Despite its Islamic beliefs, it is separate from Arab and Persian races and confronts massive Indian power.
2- The long occupation by Great Britain, followed by the rise of India and threat of expansion of communistic Russia to the South, towards the warm oceans, all make Pakistan insecure and vulnerable. That justified to Khan his endeavor for his nation's survival.
3- Israel's success for deceiving the world and possessing the bomb gave hope to a greater Pakistan to do the same.
4- Long before the Nuclear age, Western colonialists had imposed on their colonies restraints on the size of armies and owning heavy weapons. Only guns, pistols, and horses were allowed in order to deprive the occupied people from seeking independence. That hardened the mistrust of newly independent nations towards greater powers.
5- Whether the European suppliers of high tech were fooled by Khan or were smarter to sell technology that might never be used, is questionable. They got the money, Khan get the security. The F-16' have never been used to drop the bomb as Barlaw theorized and thus politicians prevailed.
One might wander of how human civilization has endured those millions of years without the nuclear deterrent? Had overpopulation or scarcity of energy sources been the driving force for conflicts, wouldn't nuclear energy diminish that drive, instead of amplifying it?
Unfortunately ghosts like Slobodan Malosovitch, Kim Il Sung, Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler have greatly diminished mankind's trust in playing with the atom. The book thus sets to search global security through published literature on the Pakistani scientist without have inside knowledge on the exact means of his accomplishments.
Mohamed F. El-Hewie
Author of
Essentials of Weightlifting and Strength Training
Best part of the book is the section on Gaddafi of Libya September 17, 2006
Ca A. No (USA)
5 out of 7 found this review helpful
And how in detail he aborted his nuclear bomb building project soon after Saddam was taken out of power in Iraq by the USA. You'll also learn interesting stuff like about how terrorist leader Gaddafi tried for over 20 years to get a nuke bomb for Libya but was happily unsuccessful.
 Ego = mc squared September 21, 2006
T. R. Santhanakrishnan (Chennai, Tamil Nadu India)
5 out of 6 found this review helpful
The nuclear five missed an opportunity to give up their arsenal and get everyone's covenant to stay away from the bomb. It is only natural that some states and some nations sought to avoid the "less than equal" status by joining the nuclear club overtly and covertly.
Pakistan is probably the only state that was smart enough to get the bomb but not wise enough to "control" access to technology. Individuals were more important than institutions. A Q Khan used the nation's need for a bomb to create a personal fiefdom that was beyond any institutionalized control. Benazir Bhutto, the PM of Pakistan, could not visit his laboratories and got her first glimpse of Khan's facility and work when the United States shared with her the results of their espionage!
A Q Khan used his intelligence and his ability to manage perceptions to create several myths:
(a) He was not the father of Pakistan's bomb. The bomb came from PAEC and its scientists Munir Khan and Mubarakmand. (Khan had a parallel initiative in Kahuta but did not have enough "cold test" experiences to do the honours). Khan was however the one to take the limelight and give an exaggerated impression of his role. The nation took to the flamboyant A Q K and ignored the true heroes of PAEC.
(b) He was not keeping Pakistan's interest in mind. Z A Bhutto was astute in stating that Pakistan's bomb should not take the image of an Islamic bomb. Khan ignored this, and for personal gain, in an uncontrolled manner sold technology (stolen from URENCO) to Iran, Libya and North Korea. For money. Without approval from Pakistan's policy makers.
Increasing insensitivity to oppressed causes, increasing unwillingness of majority to live with a homogenous minority, increasing conflict between nations and states have all enhanced threats from terrorism and threats from rogue states for humanity.
A Q Khan's clanedestine one stop shopping mall for nuclear technology to anyone with money (and often poor credentials) may have handed terrorists and rogue states their first chance to acquire technology that has so far been under the rigorous control of responsible States including the State of Pakistan. At relatively inexpensive prices.
A Q Khan has endangered the World and has significantly affected Pakistan's image as a responsible State.
Gordon Correra traces the history of Khan's rise and fall. The author must have worked hard to get all the facts from a very sensitive nation, on a very sensitive issue. The author continues to sustain the reader's interest and attention by an easy and narrative style. Yet the book has enough material for a serious researcher to pursue further.
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