|
Kilima.com - an international online store featuring Art, Film, History, Literature,
Music and Travel... |
|
|
|
|
Conflict Unending | 
enlarge | Author: Sumit Ganguly Publisher: Columbia University Press Category: Book
List Price: $28.00 Buy Used: $4.00 You Save: $24.00 (86%)
New (15) Used (28) from $4.00
Rating: 9 reviews Sales Rank: 594835
Media: Paperback Pages: 200 Number Of Items: 1 Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7 Dimensions (in): 8.3 x 5.5 x 0.5
ISBN: 0231123698 Dewey Decimal Number: 954.04 EAN: 9780231123693 ASIN: 0231123698
Publication Date: April 15, 2002 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Shipping: Expedited shipping available
| |
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
-- Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times
|
| Customer Reviews: Read 4 more reviews...
A Superb India-Pakistan Primer November 4, 2002 Sir Charles Panther (Alexandria, Virginny, USandA) 13 out of 17 found this review helpful
Ganguly provides a valuable service with this book, an accessible, easy to read historical account and observation of India-Pakistan relations, in the context of their frequent wars and crises since 1947. Credit goes to Ganguly for making a no-nonsense call on the source of most of the intransigence and crisis, Pakistan. The reasons are numerous and different depending on the crisis at hand, and the discussions extensive (yet easy to follow), but Ganguly lays most of the blame for the ongoing problems between India and Pakistan at Pakistan's feet, more specifically at the feet of its arrogant, immature, and impetuous armed forces. India certainly is not without blame both for creating and exacerbating tension with Pakistan, and Ganguly highlights this when required.This is an excellent primer on India-Pakistan relations, tensions, and warfare since their mutual 1947 independence. Ganguly discusses (by chapter) the 1947 war of independence/Partition (The First Kashmir War), the 1965 Second Kashmir War, the 1971Bangladesh War, and the Kargil Crisis/War of 1999. He includes two very useful chapters on the seemingly unending relationship of crisis between India and Pakistan and the recently public nuclear dimension of the relationship. This 2001 edition concludes shortly after 9/11/01 and its unfolding consequences, with some short personal observations and minor assessment from Ganguly, but does not benefit from a detailed analytical exploration of how the 9/11 attacks and their international political aftermath will affect the India-Pakistan situation. The presentation of this extremely complex relationship is straightforward and simple, at least as simple as it can be presented and still retain the key aspects of the history. Ganguly's narrative proceeds quickly, is easy to read and follow, and only briefly (in the introduction mainly) does he stray into dogmatic academic language. His simplification and logical, flowing delivery of this complex subject is a major accomplishment in itself. This is not to say that this is a dumbed-down history of India-Pakistan relations, not in the least. His abundant citations illustrate his depth of knowledge on this subject, and serve as ample sources of information and reference for those who wish to pursue individual issues further. Throughout the book Ganguly makes a logical and very clear argument that almost all of the bases for Pakistan's continued intransigence on Jammu and Kashmir, hence virtually all of the reasons for Indian and Pakistani animosity have ceased to exist. Pakistan's assumed mandate of foundation, as a homeland for South Asian Islam, has lost its legitimacy through the various crises in Jammu and Kashmir and their outcomes, and due to the "loss" of Bangladesh in 1971. Sadly, the outlook for tension between the two is not good, as Pakistan has come to rely increasingly on Muslim nationalism and its attendant creeping fundamentalism in order to bolster its essentially hollow claims to Jammu and Kashmir. The extremely useful citations are in the form of chapter end notes, and reflect Ganguly's total familiarity with all major, minor, and related India-Pakistan issues. This does require some distractive page-turning to get to the specific citation or additional point of fact as you read, but the end notes serve to maintain the smooth, flowing narrative. Especially useful in this book are the appendices, a collection of nine essential documents from the history of India-Pakistan relations, including the 1947 letter of accession of Jammu and Kashmir, the 1972 Simla Agreement, and the 1999 Lahore Declaration. These documents are crucial to understanding the more esoteric aspects of this enduring conflict, are cited frequently throughout the book, and the inclusion of them as appendices is very thoughtful. The 14-page index is thorough and references almost all persons, places, events, issues, and concepts mentioned in the narrative. The index does not include reference to any of the citations, requiring a thorough (and tedious) reading of them to derive maximum research benefit. This is an excellent introductory study for any serious student of South Asian relations and foreign policy. As such, I recommend this book for high school AP and college-level introductory South Asian/World Politics courses. Its easy narrative and fast pace allow for quick absorption and general understanding without a weight of detail and context. Not to say context and details are unimportant, Ganguly offers his copious citations for anyone interested in pursuing individual issues and opinions in depth. For any casual reader on international affairs, this is a valuable introduction to the history behind and general current state of play in what is arguably the world's most dangerous flashpoint.
Certainly not the whole picture July 1, 2002 10 out of 16 found this review helpful
This was my first book on this particular subject, and while it covered quite a bit of information, it left a great deal to be desired. One issue I had was the bias of the Indian author. Over and over again, he harped on the inability of Pakistan to understand how superior India's military was compared to theirs. That may be a fact, but if you follow that argument to it's logical conclusion, then the U.S. would have certainly won the war against the Vietnamese. I also feel like he downplayed the religious and cultural animosity between Hindus and Muslims, and he only made a passing reference to the fight over water rights between Indians and Pakistanis. The book was worth reading, but I am sure there must be other books that provide a more balanced and complete view of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
A Good read June 9, 2002 WhoWasJohnG (Morganville, NJ United States) 9 out of 13 found this review helpful
Mr. Ganguly has written a consice book that's quiet readable in a few hours and provides a good overview of the issues. The book doesn't go into details of "what" as much it goes into "why". His analysis adds nothing new. Book contains some interesting documents in the appendix; letter of accession of Kashmir to India, UN resolutions of 1948, Tashkent and Simla agreements etc. etc. The books covers upto 2001 and the last year probably is not well researched. If you haven't read or are new to this issue, this book could be a great starter.
Not worth it August 6, 2002 Taimur M. Khan (Philadelphia,PA) 8 out of 26 found this review helpful
A rather disappointing book.Mr Ganguly is unable to overcome his bias against Pakistan, and repeatedly harps on India's perceived military superiority over Pakistan.A good book on the issue of Kashmir is difficult to find. Victoria Schofield's Kashmir in Conflict is a good book,but some say that her friendship with Pakistan's former Prime minister Benazir Bhutto makes her a biased writer.Overall,Mr Ganguly has been unable to contain his patriotism while writing this book.I would not recommend this book to first time readers on the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.
Usual Indian Bias June 14, 2002 7 out of 16 found this review helpful
This book represents the bias of a mouthpiece for the Indian position. It is not a balanced analysis of the situation, its causes and solutions. The 'ultimate' cop-out is proposing the LoC as an international boundary. That will perpetuate the conflict, not close it. Save your money for something else.
|
|
|
|
| |
|