Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Oren presents the history from a military, diplomatic, political and cultural perspective. Through the extensive examination of archives, official reports, memoirs and interviews with surviving figures, Oren details the roles played by all the major players from the perspective of, not just the Israelis but the Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians as well as the United States and the Soviet Union.

After beginning by presenting a brief synopsis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that point, Oren describes the series of miscalculations by Nasser that led Egypt into war several years before he intended. A combination of Syrian bellicosity, support of Palestinian terrorist incursions in Northern Israel together with the goading of his unstable general Amer, led Nasser to force the United Nations out of the de-militarized Sinai and to illegally close the Tiran straits to Israeli shipping, tantamount to a declaration of war. As Oren clearly shows, war with Egypt was inevitable the moment the straits were closed. No sovereign nation could ignore a blockade of its shipping.

Oren chronicles Israel's political struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union to permit an appropriate military response to Egypt's provocations.. Despite the clear act of war by Egypt, the Johnson administration, hobbled by Vietnam and fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets, urged Israel to show restraint. Oren describes the agony of Eskhol and the Israeli government in deciding how to attack preemptively without alienating the United States. In the famous meeting between Abba Eban and President Johnson, Johnson practically urged Israel to absorb a first strike. The execrable Charles De Gaulle did overtly demand this. Israeli military doctrine required the preemptive destruction of the enemy air forces. The tension drove Rabin to a temporary breakdown and probably took years off Eskhol's life.

Once the war started with Israel's lightning strike on the Egyptian Air Force, Oren shows how events followed their own trajectory with Jordan drawn in and then Syria and Israel's military objectives changing on a constant basis. Indeed, what becomes clear is that Israel never had any particular political objective other than the elimination of the direct existential threat. Contrary to anti-Israel revisionists, Israel never had any specific designs on the West Bank or even the old city of Jerusalem. Ironically, the decision to conquer the old city of Jerusalem was not made until he last possible moment, even after much of the West Bank was already in Israeli hands.

From the Arab perspective, Oren shows just how and why the war turned into a disaster. The Egyptian forces lacked any semblance of unified command or communications. Nasser's officers were afraid to tell him the truth. While her forces were in full retreat, her air force lying in ruins, Egypt continued to broadcast the basest propaganda that her forces were advancing towards Tel a Viv. Hussein, meanwhile, was trapped by his fear of Nasser and the Syrian radicals into attacking Israel in Jerusalem.

Also fascinating is the extent to which political and diplomatic considerations played a role in military strategy and increased Israeli casualties. For example, Eskhol delayed for so long the decision to take the Golan heights, that the IDF was unable to take the proper preparatory steps which would have included artillery bombardments, air bombings and a night time attack. Instead the brave soldiers of the IDF advanced straight into murderous Syrian fire. This was true for the Jerusalem campaign as well.

Ultimately, the value of this book is that it shows the context of the war. It is easy for revisionists to argue that Israel's conquests of the Golan and the West Bank were not necessary. What Oren shows is that, with the exception of Jerusalem, the Israeli offensives were not for the purpose of expanding Israel's territory but purely for geo-political diplomatic purposes. Once forced to fight, Israel was determined not to be forced to remain within indefensible cease fire lines as she was in 1948. There is no question that Israel's basic war aims were to eliminate the offensive capabilities of the enemies on her border and to force them to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the nature of these regimes made a peaceful solution impossible and more bloodletting would be required.

Oren contrasts the totalitarian Egyptian and Syrian regimes with the raucous Israeli democracy where decisions on basic war strategy were taken by consensus in the famous "pit". Oren makes a point of noting that, despite the general's dismay and outright disgust at Eskhol's restraint (borne of his fear of antagonizing the Soviets and the Americans), never for one moment did they consider disregarding his orders. The hallmark of a true democracy is the subordination of the military to civilian command. Nasser, by contrast, was in constant fear of military overthrow.

Oren's dispassionate analysis reveals the positive and negative roles played by the major players in the drama. The Mercurial Moshe Dyan does not come across as positively as his reputation would suggest. His inscrutable nature would endanger Israel in 1973. Eskhol is fully exonerated. Indeed, when the full story is revealed, it is difficult to think of another Israeli political figure better suited to deal with the myriad of competing considerations. Nasser comes across as more deluded and broken than evil. Hussein appears to be a victim of forces beyond his control. The Soviets are revealed in all their villainy. This book is destined to be a true classic. It will be to the Six Day War what "O Jerusalem" is to the War for Independence. It is a must read for anyone interested in the history of Israel.


If You Have Time for Only One Book on the Middle East   May 28, 2002
86 out of 92 found this review helpful

If you have time for only one book on the Middle East, purchase this book. Much of the current dispute is a result of the events of the 6 Day War. Mr. Oren's work incudes over 80 pages of footnotes, many referencing recently declassified files and personal interviews with the key players.

Although packed with information, the book is well edited and a relatively easy read - managing to build suspense although the outcome is well known.

No one emerges as a complete hero or a complete villian in Mr. Oren's gripping narrative - a tribute to the balanced, objective nature of the work.

After reading this book, the reader will never view current developments in the Middle East in the same light.


Best Book on Modern Middle East - Better than Clancy Tales   June 11, 2002
Mark D Burgh (Fort Smith, AR United States)
70 out of 80 found this review helpful

Michael Oren's book is a gripping account of the Six-Day War, one that is clear from his extensive research, no one wanted. Oren shows the complex issues that moved the Egypt and Israel into a deadly tragedy. Putting the Six-Day War into his vast Cold War context illuminates the impotence of the Superpowers, the incompetence of Egypt and Syria, and the dangerous gamble Israel took when launching its necessary strike.

Oren gives us as many perspectives as he can; American, Russian, Israeli, Eqyptian, Jordanian, English participants all have their say. The brilliance of this book is not just Oren's gripping account of the war, but his making the reader understand the incredible pressure that Nasser, King Hussein, and Levi Eshkol were under. This book made me feel some sympathy for the Egyptians, poorly-led, sacrificed to Nasser's macho posturing and cronyism, to Cold war cant, and massive poverty.

What is chilling about this book is that nearly forty years later, not much has changed, as Oren points out.

Readers of Tom Clancy will find real people and real tragedy more gripping than fake heroics; no heros here, just survivors.


everything you want to know about the 6 day war and more   May 15, 2002
68 out of 92 found this review helpful

this is one of the finest book written about any war. not only does it cover in fascinating detail the actual battles of the war, but the circumstances that led up to this war, the diplomat intrigue before, during and after the war and what were the consequences of the conflict.

this book reads like the best war fiction written, but it's all true.

absolutely worthy of a read


One point of clarification....   October 7, 2006
Mr Bassil A MARDELLI (Riad El-SOLH , Beirut Lebanon)
50 out of 52 found this review helpful

There is a fundamental difference between `armistice' and `peace'.
Armistice is military.
Peace is political.
((It is strange to see that those who wanted to lend their names to `peace between Israel/Arabs, have been killed. (!!!) Sadat - Rabin - and even Arafat whose sudden demise is still questionable.))

However, just one point of clarification: going back in history to the November 29th. 1947 UN Partition Plan of Palestine to resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict, it is worth mentioning that the Arabs did indeed accept Partition.
The irony is that they (Arabs) have not had the audacity to declare it openly.
Arab delegations worked and attended meetings the gist of which had been the `Partition Plan', but never echoed their acceptance, with concern, to significant number of the Palestinian population, most of all to Hajj Amine Husseini and his supporters.
Whereas the `Jews' (there was no Israel per se in 1947) while publicly and vocally advocated their support for `Partition', actually worked against it and fought in 1948 with full force and got more than prescribed in the UN Resolution 181.