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The Cold War: A New History | 
 enlarge | Author: John Lewis Gaddis
Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Category: Book
List Price: $16.00
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Rating:  63 reviews
Sales Rank: 36107
Media: Paperback
Pages: 352
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7
Dimensions (in): 8.4 x 5.4 x 0.8
ISBN: 0143038273
Dewey Decimal Number: 909.825
EAN: 9780143038276
ASIN: 0143038273
Publication Date: December 26, 2006
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Product Description
The dean of Cold War historians (The New York Times) now presents the definitive account of the global confrontation that dominated the last half of the twentieth century. Drawing on newly opened archives and the reminiscences of the major players, John Lewis Gaddis explains not just what happened but why from the months in 1945 when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went from alliance to antagonism to the barely averted holocaust of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the maneuvers of Nixon and Mao, Reagan and Gorbachev. Brilliant, accessible, almost Shakespearean in its drama, The Cold War stands as a triumphant summation of the era that, more than any other, shaped our own.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 58 more reviews...
 The Cold War in the Rearview Mirror February 8, 2006
Izaak VanGaalen (San Francisco, CA USA)
57 out of 65 found this review helpful
Yale history professor John Lewis Gaddis is America's foremost historian of the Cold War. Since the publication of "The United States and the Origins of the Cold War" in 1972, he has written a half dozen more books on the subject, each time finding a new perspective on the superpower standoff that took place between 1946 and 1991.
Prior to the 1970's, American historians, for the most part, put the blame of the origins of the Cold War on the Soviet system in general and on Josef Stalin in particular. Gaddis' early work was original insofar as it gave a more balanced perspective on the American/Soviet confrontation. After World War II, both superpowers acted rationally to protect their interests, having sacrificed many lives in hard-fought battles. Each side was protecting a way of life they thought morally superior.
In the current work under review, Gaddis' views seem to be evolving. Looking back at the Cold War in light of events since 1991, he concludes that it was primarily the power of ideas that won, since nuclear weapons had made military confrontation unthinkable. The liberal democracies and market economies of the West were better able to provide for their citizens than the command economies of the totalitarian system. The West offered their citizens hope while the Soviets instilled theirs with fear. Gaddis now believes it was the Soviets who were primarily responsible for starting the Cold War.
But why did the Cold War last so many years? Why didn't people rise up earlier? One reason, of course, was nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons prolonged the Cold War. The West had few options other than detente and containment. Gaddis has few kind words for the Nixon-Kissinger detente that left hundreds of thousands of disillusioned people behind the Iron Curtain without hope. He recounts in this book how certain key individuals facilitated change. Among these "saboteurs of the status quo" were Ronald Reagan, Margret Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, and Lech Walesa. According to Gaddis, when Pope John Paul II went to Poland and kissed the ground, it marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Also, when Ronald Reagan sought to exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union by building an antimissle shield that he knew the Soviets couldn't match, he helped bring about the demise of the system. Also, adding to the slipstream of the demise was the unwitting assistance of Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev was different from previous Soviet leaders - and the world is forever in his debt - in that he realized the arms race could not continue and that the Soviet Union could no longer maintain control over the populations of Eastern Europe.
Although Gaddis' work has been used by the Bush Administration as an endorsement of spreading democracy in the Middle East, it should be noted that the saboteurs of the status quo - and Bush sees himself as such - can only facilitate change. The real change, Gaddis argues, must come from the bottom up. Ronald Reagan did not end the Cold War - though he contributed greatly to its conclusion. The Hungarians, the Poles, and the East Germans ended the Cold War as they faced down the repressive Soviet system. This is all very illuminating with our present involvement in the Middle East.
This is an excellent, well-written and well-argued one-volume history of the Cold War, written by one of its most diligent historians. I highly recommend this book.
A Masterpiece! Concise yet Authoritative January 27, 2006
T. Carlsen
50 out of 80 found this review helpful
This book is a masterpiece! It is concise and easy-to-read, yet authoritative. Yale professor John Lewis Gaddis has been a distinguished scholar of the Cold War for decades, and this book received great reviews from George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and experts on the former USSR, such as William Taubman (Pulitzer Prize author of "Khrushchev") and Anne Applebaum (Pulitzer Prize author of "Gulag"). I highly recommend it!
Gaddis correctly begins the story of the Cold War during World War Two, and even before. The Allies kept their alliance together long enough to destroy Hitler, but USA and USSR emerged from WWII as superpower rivals. The Cold War was inevitable. Stalin wanted big gains from WWII because of the tremendous sacrifices that USSR suffered. He first wanted a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, and then he wanted Communist influence around the world. In contrast, Roosevelt wanted security and a better world - not selfish gains. FDR and Churchill issued their war aims through the Atlantic Charter: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Worship, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want, the right to self-determination, etc. (The Russian generals, by the way, allowed their soldiers to rape 2 million German women).
Stalin distrusted USA and Britain because he suspected that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill repeatedly postponed a second-front so that the Soviets would suffer maximum casualties fighting Nazi Germany. 20 million Soviets died in WWII, while 400,000 Americans died. In return, USA and Britain were distrustful of USSR. As FDR said two weeks before he died, "Stalin has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta!"
USSR was founded on authoritarianism and hatred towards capitalism. In contrast, America was founded on the principle of restrained government and the individual's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable, but nuclear weapons now existed and could annihilate the world. WWII had killed 55 million people. Could World War Three be avoided?
FDR tried to put in place a post-war system of international relations, such as the UN, to prevent WWIII. After FDR's death, Eleanor Roosevelt worked to achieve the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Leading up to WWII, FDR had tactfully pulled America from isolationism to destroy Hitler. Would America stay engaged in world affairs as FDR had planned or slip back into isolationism? Would Stalin get what he wanted?
Stalin had the advantage in the early years of the Cold War, but he blundered. USSR had massive armies in Eastern Europe, and Communism was popular in parts of Europe. (Stalin's mass murders were not yet known). Stalin calculated that capitalism would falter as it had during the Great Depression, that capitalist countries would squabble with greed, and that Communists would then legally gain power through elections.
Stalin dominated Poland by refusing to allow free elections as promised in writing at Yalta. Harry Truman gave a "tongue lashing" to USSR foreign minister Molotov to honor the promise, but nothing could be done. (Read David McCullough's Pulitzer Prize-winning "Truman"). The much larger Soviet armies were initially checked by America's monopoly on the bomb, but then the Soviets tested their own atomic bomb. That's when George Kennan and George Marshall devised the strategy called containment. To win-over the Europeans, the Americans launched the Marshall Plan, which offered massive aid to ANY country that wanted it.
Stalin's response to the Marshall Plan was a diplomatic disaster for USSR. He refused Marshall Plan aid to Eastern European countries, and then he blockaded Berlin. This appeared to be a setback for USA, but it actually reduced Stalin's influence. Stalin himself brought down the Iron Curtain. Truman then proclaimed his Truman Doctrine and formed the NATO alliance.
One president who is often overlooked, but receives recognition in this book, is Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower rejected the idea that nuclear weapons could be used in limited combat, setting an important precedent to never use them. He understood the panic of combat and that an escalating nuclear response would result. According to Eisenhower's official biographer, Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower was pressured to launch a first strike against USSR "many times - at least four times" but he would not do it. (Read "American Heritage Great Minds of History: Interviews by Roger Mudd," available at Amazon.com).
After the Soviets ruthlessly crushed the rebellions in Eastern Europe, killing tens of thousands, Eisenhower refused to help because he believed that a direct clash with USSR could destroy the world. His credentials as Supreme Allied Commander during WWII allowed him to pull this off as nobody else could. (In contrast, Lyndon Johnson felt he could not avoid Vietnam). Eisenhower instead emphasized the importance of avoiding a hot war and talked about the brutal concept of total war.
The Kennedy administration devised the strategy called MAD - mutually assured destruction. John Kennedy then gave his legendary "I am a Berliner" speech after the Soviets built the Berlin Wall, and he skillfully handled the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After the Watergate scandal, America's Cold War policies came under scrutiny. Containment required making alliances with brutal regimes, such as the Shaw of Iran. The CIA occasionally used controversial tactics, such as the Eisenhower administration overthrowing the democratic (but socialist) government of Guatemala, the Nixon administration undermining the democracy of Chile (inadvertently bringing the tyrant Pinochet to power), and the Reagan administration supporting the El Salvador regime that utilized death squads. Detente also was scrutinized.
According to Gaddis, the 1975 Helsinki accord was a landmark event: "Brezhnev and the Kremlin leadership proposed a `conference on security and cooperation in Europe' ...[which] would require the United States and its allies to state publicly and in writing that they accepted the postwar division of Europe. The Kremlin leader was almost capitalist in the importance he attached to this contractual obligation, which he believed would discourage future `Prague springs'... and he was willing to make extraordinary concessions to get this commitment... most surprisingly, recognizing `the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms... in conformance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'
"...Liberals and conservatives alike denounced [the Helsinki accord]... Pursuing detente was hardly worth it if it meant perpetuating injustice by recognizing Soviet control in Eastern Europe... These episodes made Helsinki a liability to [Gerald] Ford during the 1976 presidential campaign... Helsinki's effects inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, were equally unexpected, and far more significant. Brezhnev had looked forward, Dobrynin recalls, to the `publicity he would gain... when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries for which they had sacrificed so much'... [Instead,] `it gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement'... Brezhnev could hardly repudiate what he had agreed to... human rights... What this meant was that the people who lived under these systems - at least the more courageous - could claim official permission to say what they thought."
The fall of the Soviet empire eventually came when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power. Unlike his hard-line Communist predecessors, Gorbachev refused to ruthlessly crush the rebellions that broke-out under his watch, and the Soviet empire unraveled. Gorbachev won the Nobel Peace Prize and the first Ronald Reagan Freedom Award.
When Gorbachev first took power, the USSR economy was a shambles, because Communism is an inferior economic system. The Soviets also lost the Afghanistan war. Gorbachev felt he had to do something bold, so he implemented Perestroika and Glasnost reforms to try and revive USSR. Those freedoms allowed rebellion to take root, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland led by Lech Walesa. According to Gaddis, "When John Paul II kissed the ground at the Warsaw airport on June 2, 1979, he began the process by which Communism in Poland - and ultimately everywhere else in Europe - would come to an end." John Paul II was a worldwide celebrity and openly condemned Communism.
According to Gaddis, "The Cold War itself was a kind of theater in which distinctions between illusions and reality were not always obvious. It presented great opportunities for great actors to play great roles." With his good acting skills, Ronald Reagan at first applied the pressure, calling USSR "the evil empire." Reagan modeled his presidential role after his idol FDR. (Reagan voted for FDR four times). He was deeply inspired by FDR's supremely-confident bashing of Nazi Germany and spirited defense of democracy. (Read Douglas Brinkley's "Boys of Pointe du Hoc" and Lou Cannon's "President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime"). Now Reagan would turn that role against USSR. Reagan restored America's strength.
But once Gorbachev came to power, Reagan changed his position and welcomed Gorbachev as a good friend. The Cold War peacefully ended in 1987. (Read "Reagan and Gorbachev" by Jack Matlock, Reagan's top advisor and ambassador to USSR). Then Reagan applied his charm through diplomacy, urging Gorbachev to go further with reform: "We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness... General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization... Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"
Gaddis writes, "Secretary of State Shultz, a former economics professor at Stanford, took it upon himself to educate... Gorbachev, as early as 1985, on the impossibility of a closed society being prosperous... Over the next several years, he used his trips to [Moscow] to run tutorials for Gorbachev and his advisors, even bringing pie charts... When Reagan visited the Soviet Union in May, 1988, Gorbachev arranged for him to lecture at Moscow University on the virtues of market capitalization." Gorbachev's reforms failed to revive the USSR economy. Instead, they unleashed Pandora's Box of freedom. Once the door was opened, it could not be put back.
The Berlin Wall was decreed open on November 9, 1989. Gaddis writes, "The border guards at Bornholmer Strasse took it upon themselves to open the gates... Soon Germans from both sides were sitting, standing and even dancing on the wall."
In his autobiography called "An American Life," Reagan shared his warm feelings for Gorbachev and his fear that Gorbachev might be ousted by Communist hardliners: "I was concerned for his safety... I've still worried about him: How hard and fast can he push reforms without risking his life?" Eventually the hardliners in USSR finally got fed-up with Gorbachev's liberal reforms and tried to oust Gorbachev with a coup, but the coup failed. Then everything unraveled, with Boris Yeltsin leading the resistance in the streets of Moscow. Yeltsin became leader of the new Russia and USSR ceased to exist.
By the way, Gaddis states that Reagan had long wished to abolish all nuclear weapons. At the Reykjavik summit, Reagan proposed abolishing all nukes and sharing SDI technology, which Reagan thought would make nukes obsolete, but Gorbachev declined. (Read Paul Lettow's "Ronald Reagan and his Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons").
Finally, I am in a unique position to recommend this book because I had the opportunity to witness the unraveling of the Soviet empire. In college I studied the Cold War and took a trip to USSR with my university when Gorbachev was in power and Bush senior was president. I saw firsthand that the Russian economy was languishing. I view Communism as a despicable aberration of history.
Rebellion was stirring in USSR in many places. I observed a vigorous rebellion in Lithuania. There was a huge demonstration, and Soviet helicopters dropped leaflets warning the Lithuanians to immediately stop the rebellion. I have one of the leaflets as a priceless memorabilia of the Cold War. Soviet tanks rumbled through the capital. But Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, would not brutally crack down.
I also recommend the Pulitzer-Prize winning book about the collapse of USSR called "Lenin's Tomb" by David Remnick.
Excellent Overview of the Central Themes of the Cold War December 30, 2005
P. Valka (London, UK)
22 out of 28 found this review helpful
John Lewis Gaddis, arguably the preeminent Cold War historian, provides a very readable and lucid account of the central issues, themes and events of the Cold War. Synthesizing the vast scholarship he conducted over the year into a single volume, Gaddis tries to provide an introduction to this defining conflict - especially to those who know little of it. While the book doesn't often go into the interesting details and intricacies as much as I would have liked, it does a superb job at outlining and analyzing the central issues of the Cold War. Only someone with such a tremendous understanding of the conflict as Gaddis would be able to do it properly with such a discerning eye.
Even for those who have read extensively on the Cold War, this book puts the important currents of the war into a compelling framework. It not only reinforces one's own knowledge but provides an amazing focus on what is most important for proper understanding and analysis of the war.
... January 12, 2006
Sean Brocklebank (Edinburgh)
15 out of 19 found this review helpful
The Good:
- Gaddis' 'Cold War' more than fulfills that basic requirement of all good books: style. The author never dwells on trifles, the book never gets dull, and you are more likely than not to be left wanting more when you finish it.
- More importantly though, the analysis is simply brilliant. Gaddis seems to have made it his purpose in this text to tackle the big 'whys' of the cold war: why the major events played out the way they did, why the major actors did what they did, why it all started, and why it ended.
- Another strong point is the author's encyclopedic knowledge of his sources. Gaddis is able to deploy the 'perfect quote' with unerring skill, and his evident familiarity with recently opened archives gives this book a distinct edge over older works on the same topic.
The Bad:
- The flip side of my second point above is that with so much analysis in a book which is so short to begin with, there is fairly little of the traditional historical narrative in this book. While that is probably a good thing for those who are already familiar with the major events of the conflict, it does detract somewhat from the ability of this book to function as an introduction to the cold war (which is the purpose Gaddis states in the preface).
- Otherwise, my only actual complaint about the book (and really, it's more of a quibble) is that the commendable objectivity which the author uses to describe the opening and middle events of the cold war seems to fade somewhat as we draw near to its close. Descriptions of Reagan, for example, are positively fawning, while those of Thatcher are only somewhat less exuberant.
In Summary:
-This is one of the most gripping works of non-fiction of any kind, and far and away the best single book about the cold war I have yet read. Highly recommended to anyone with an interest in the history of the 20th century.
 Not History but Commentary February 5, 2006
H. N. Teixeira (Los Angeles, CA United States)
14 out of 23 found this review helpful
As many have already stated this book is a strange combination of being too basic and assuming to much. While reading I kept wishing it was longer since there was very little substance to each segment it covered. I also think that the fact that it goes considerably forward and backward in time pointless and creates some repetition in a book that already covers too little ground. A history of the Cold War is just too complicated to have even an abbreviated version in about 250 pages. The author is brave to try but he ends up being at the same time too obscure for beginners since he won't explain the context (or even the events) in any depth while at the same time too simplistic for those more educated on the subject who will find frustrating that he never elaborates some incredibly bold assertions.
I will give an example, in page 204 (hardcover edition) he mentions how Sadat expected to lose the 1973 war but gain a political victory from it. Really... wow that's really amazing... I wish it had been more than just MENTIONED! This "fact" lacks even a reference! (yep, no mention of a bibliographical reference at all). I'm sure Sadat must have been really surprised at his near victory then. Knowing the level of the average Yale professor I don't doubt that Dr Gaddis has a good (or at least some) foundation for this claim, what I find unbelievable is that he would mention things like this throughout the book without an explanation or source. That is just lazy writing.
Therefore this book falls below the mark for a good history book, since it lacks any contexts, descriptions, and often even source; and is more accurately described as a commentary (in this case of the Cold War in general), however it fails to be a good commentary for being incredibly shallow and diffuse to the point that it hardly adds anything to the subject.
It is a good idea to write a single volume history of the Cold War, this one however will only please a very narrow audience that doesn't need contextualization and description and yet accepts superficial (and frequently non-cited) commentary.
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