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Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games | 
 enlarge | Author: Tennent H. Bagley
Publisher: Yale University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $19.00
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Rating:  15 reviews
Sales Rank: 168171
Media: Paperback
Pages: 336
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6 x 0.9
ISBN: 0300136242
Dewey Decimal Number: 364
EAN: 9780300136241
ASIN: 0300136242
Publication Date: May 27, 2008
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Amazon.com Review
Amazon Significant Seven, May 2007: Utterly compelling from page one, Tennent H. Bagley's Spy Wars documents the strange case of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who approached the CIA in the early 1960s (apparently) ready to divulge a treasure trove of secrets, including information on Soviet intelligence operations, KGB surveillance tactics, and even Lee Harvey Oswald s time in Russia. But was Nosenko a source of legitimate information, or a KGB loyalist sent to misdirect CIA efforts? It's a controversial question to this day, but one that Bagley, as a scion of a storied Navy family and then supervisor of the CIA s operations against the KGB, is uniquely qualified to dissect. Along the way, he vividly recounts the chess match between the rival intelligence agencies during the opening salvoes of the Cold War, and it s as cloak-and-dagger as any LeCarre fan could hope--double-agents, miniature cameras hidden behind neckties, microfilm, and other trappings of the spy game abound in this fascinating and fast-paced real-life thriller. --Jon Foro
Product Description
In this rapidly paced book, a former CIA chief of counter intelligence breaks open the mysterious case of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko's 1964 defection to the United States. Still a highly controversial chapter in the history of Cold War espionage, the Nosenko affair has inspired debate for more than forty years: was Nosenko a bona fide defector with the real information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in Soviet Russia, or was he a KGB loyalist, engaged in a complex game of deception?As supervisor of CIA operations against the KGB at the time, Tennent H. Bagley directly handled Nosenko's case. This insider knowledge, combined with information gleaned from dozens of interviews with former KGB adversaries, places Bagley in a uniquely authoritative position. He guides the reader step by step through the complicated operations surrounding the Nosenko affair and shatters the comfortable version of events the CIA has presented to the public. Bagley unveils not only the KGB's history of merciless and bloody betrayals but also the existence of undiscovered traitors in the American camp. Shining new light on the CIA-KGB spy wars, he invites deeper thinking about the history of espionage and its implications for the intelligence community today.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 10 more reviews...
 So Fascinating It Makes Your Head Hurt April 29, 2007
Bruce Trinque (Amston, CT United States)
33 out of 34 found this review helpful
In 1962 in Geneva a KGB officer named Yuri Nosenko contacted the CIA to supply them with information about KGB operations, before returning to the Soviet Union. In the beginning of 1964, Nosenko unexpectedly surfaced again in the West and re-contacted the CIA. This time he told the Americans that he had had charge of the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald, who had assassinated John F. Kennedy only a couple of months before. This time, Nosenko wished to remain in the West. With bait like first-hand knowledge of the Oswald file, who could resist? But more than four decades later, the basic question remains a matter of controversy: Was Yuri Nosenko a genuine defector or was he a KGB plant?
Tennent "Pete" Bagley, the author of the present book, was the first CIA case officer to handle Nosenko and in the early and mid-Sixties he participated in intense interrogations and investigations of the supposed defector. And forty years later, Bagley remains convinced that Nosenko was a fraud, even though the official position of the CIA for many years has been that the man was a genuine defector. If what Bagley states in "Spy Wars" about Nosenko's claims is true, then the only reasonable conclusion would seem to be that Nosenko was indeed a liar (and a not particularly good liar) but, as Bagley points out, the CIA (and many other organizations) is willing to deceive itself when the alternative is painful or embarrassing (and if Nosenko was indeed accepted to be a false defector, that conclusion would be very painful and embarrassing for the CIA which has publically embraced the former Soviet officer).
There seem to be three possible general conclusions to be drawn about Nosenko: (1) he was a genuine defector whose story became confused only because of the stress of the situation (a conclusion difficult to accept in light of Bagley's revelations); (2) he was a genuine, but low-level defector who lied to make himself appear to be a much bigger fish, or (3) Nosenko's "defection" was a Soviet disinformation ploy, perhaps to protect moles and successful KGB penetrations of American cypher traffic. Bagley clearly favors the third conclusion and in essence provides an explanation of why this supposed defector appeared to be ill-prepared to successfully lie about many crucial areas. Bagley evidently believes that Nosenko was a low-level KGB operative (perhaps with a criminal background) who was being prepared for a false defection to cover real Soviet espionage successes when in the wake of the JFK Assassination, the KGB was forced to quickly revise Nosenko's story and dispatch him again to the West with "proof" that Oswald had no ties to the KGB (by the way, Bagley does not contend that the KGB played any role in the JFK Assassination, only that the Nosenko affair provided them with a temptizingly convenient way of placing a greater distance between themselves and the killing).
I have been interested in the Nosenko case for about thirty years, and had supposed that by now it had been resolved (and that in the end Nosenko had proved genuine). Bagley's book instead proves that the controversy goes on (and provides a powerful voice labeling Nosenko a fraud).
Espionage and counterintelligence have been called "a wilderness of mirrors" and Bagley's "Spy Wars" shows just how baffling and fascinating that wilderness can be.
 The Nosekno Riddle May 6, 2007
David Blackburst
23 out of 29 found this review helpful
Pete Bagley deserves to be heard on the topic of Nosenko, not least because he has been taken to task by other writers (Mangold, Wise) over it. Bagley was THERE when Nosenko "walked in" in 1962 and observed him first hand. Nobody doubts that, at that time, at the height of the cold war, SOMEBODY needed to be suspicious of Soviet walk-ins. Bagley first thought Nosenko was a good catch, but came to caution over the predicition by Anatoli Golitsyn that false defectors would follow him. The timing and circumstances of Nosenko's January 1964 defection, soon after John Kennedy's assassination, and the serendipity that he was uniquely positioned to claim that Lee Harvey Oswald was not a KGB agent, certainly added to the suspicion. Nosenko clearly lied about some things, such as his rank and his recall to Moscow, and this created a cadre of "Fundamentalists" (including CIA's Bagley, Jim Angleton, Scotty Miler, Dave Murphy, FBI-CIA liaison Sam Papich, MI5's Arthur Martin and Peter Wright, to name a few) who have made this sort of perceived deception a life's work.
But not all those "in the know" accepted Bagley's analysis. Other CIA officers of equal credentials were skeptical, such as George Kisevalter, who handled Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovskiy, and a series of re-analyses by competent CI officers and others also came to contrary conclusions. I'm not sure if Bagley's offering is going to convince the skeptics, or allay the concerns over Nosenko's captivity. The latter certainly did not provide a warm invitation for later defectors.
It is striking that, in addition to the CIA and FBI people who think Nosenko was legit, a number of KGB defectors and others have vouched for him. During the cold war, it was Fedora and Top Hat. After the fall of the KGB, it was Nechiporenko and even Semichastny himself.
At this late date, it is hard to say if Bagley is right, even having given it his best shot. Maybe he is, and if he is, it raises troubling questions. I am still inclined to think that Nosenko was a real defector who thought his knowledge of the contents of the Oswald file were his meal ticket, and mixed with some booze and puffery, he tried to become a hero in America.
Bagley deserves to heard and read on the issue. I did find myself less secure in my beliefs after reading Spy Wars.
ADDENDUM: After further review, I wish to back off a bit on my review. After several close readings, I have to conclude that Bagley has not proven his case. While he found contradictions in Nosenko's interrogations, they do not necessarily lead to Bagley's conclusions. This book reads like conspiracy theory: It sounds convincing, but the proof falls short of conclusive. Are we really to believe that Nosenko, and by extension, a large number of other Soviet defectors, agents and post-Cold War KGB officers are STILL engaged in a coverup of Nosenko's true mission, after all these years? Do we disbelieve the long line of former KGB officers - including Semichastny, who led the KGB at the time - who insist that Nosenko was a blowhard, but a genuine one? Do we disbelieve the long line of CIA and FBI counterintelligence specialists - all as qualified as Bagley - who think Bagley is sincere, but just too hypersuspicious in this ancient case?
Some of his logic simply escapes me. Too complicated to explain here, virtually all US intelliegence pros are convinced that Dmitri Polyakov of the GRU was a real agent-in-place for the FBI. Bagley wants it both ways. He thinks Polyakov was a phony who metamorphosized into a real agent.
We NEED people like Bagley to think outside the envelope, to question the unquestionable, so that we are not fooled by a truly devious deception; but I would be a lot more comfortable with Bagley's thesis is he were less closed-minded to differing interpretations of these events. Professional disagreements sometimes die hard.
This book is still fascinating and worth reading. Is Bagley right? Maybe - but maybe not.
UPDATE: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko died under an assumed name in a southern US state at age 81 on August 23, 2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082603493.html
Not for the General Reader July 27, 2007
Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States)
18 out of 28 found this review helpful
Tim Weiner's book, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA is the better book for the general reader as well as any intelligence professional.
This book loses one star for failing to be open about the special prison built for Nesenko at "The Farm," and the extraordinarily abusive treatment he received at the hands of the Soviet Division in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). Old timers are still shaking their heads in dismay.
Recognizing that this book is a profound and detailed telling of the story from the side of those who destroyed Nosenko, I give it a four over all for detail from a particular perspective, a 3 for the general reader.
There is nothing in this book that would lead anyone to believe that the DO was anything less than quite good, and while I was tempted to drop it to a 3 for that reason, I left it at 4 for what I call special purpose reading. Deeper details than most desire, and details that cannot be evaluated alone, but must be considered in the light of many other accounts and context--don't bother if you only want to read one book.
In passing, the author confirms CIA's persistent inability to field officers with language skills, even against the "main enemy," the Russians. The author also touches on the groupthink mentality of the cult of intelligence.
Other books apart from Legacy of Ashes:
Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception, and the Secrets that Destroyed Two of the Cold War's Most Important Agents
The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West
Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism
Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times
Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence
Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million
The Plot thickens May 28, 2007
Anne Lazar (France)
17 out of 17 found this review helpful
In this well written and fast-paced book Bagley, while narrating a
mystery-filled spy case, deals with a timely question: how and why
intelligence and counterintelligence information can be suppressed and
distorted to serve political or other agendas, to the detriment of the
national interest. It serves as a warning to decision makers of the
pitfalls of wishful thinking and self protection.
The book uses the case of the Soviet KGB defector Yuri Nosenko to unveil
a fascinating, hidden world of Soviet deception. In this still
unresolved affair the CIA finally decided that Nosenko was a genuine
defector and served the interests of the United States. This position,
finally adopted by the Agency's "cool heads." used false information
that is exposed in this book. Bagley gives solid reasons to think the
position is wrong and that the KGB sent Nosenko to CIA as a provocateur.
Most important, he reveals for the first time what lay behind this KGB
deception game: moles in CIA and even more dangerous, Soviet breaking of
American secret ciphers--never uncovered to this day..
The Nosenko case developed into a gigantic and sometimes rather dirty
fight within the CIA. In the end the "cool heads" prevailed. William
Colby, after becoming CIA Director, fired the counterintelligence staff
chief James Angleton and closed the debate. But did it really end? After
the Cold War Bagley went out on his own and turned up new evidence from
KGB veterans, and his carefully researched and utterly convincing book
is likely to reopen the issue.
This is an important historical document which will be widely read and
long debated.
Maximum Counterintelligence August 19, 2007
Thaddeus W. Taylor (Bishop, CA)
15 out of 16 found this review helpful
I am a former counterintelligence officer and subject to the vestiges of the professional parinoia that is one of the occupational hazards of the field. That said, the Nosenko case, so well discribed by Mr. Bagley, still stinks. The CIA is a government bureaucracy that is even more inclined to labor under the burden of "group-think" than the Department of Motor Vehicles or some other large governmental or corporate organization. That is why the managment of the CIA wants everybody on board with the party line: Nosenko is the McCoy, the real deal.
Nosenko was a plant. The incriminating information that he revealed came before he was sequestered in Virginia. Mr. Bagley claims that the CIA Soviet Bloc (SB) branch had a legal go-ahead from high officials in the administration, the Atty. Gen. for example,to keep Nosenko under wraps. The rehabilitation of Nosenko had more to do with covering up ineptitude than any evidence that would clear up questions about Nosenko's validity. In Legacy of Ashes the author points out that many spies, traitors and moles were revealed by Nosenko. Mr. Bagely refutes this. Who were they, the exposed? Surely now someone can come forward with these names. Nosenko is an adventurer who got to play on the big stage. His efforts to convice the CIA that the communist (Oswald) that shot JFK was not working for, with or had any connection with the chief organ of the Soviet communist party whatsoever.
The House Committee on Assasinations was convinced that Nosenko was lying. This is not to say that there was any connection to the murder but it is safe to say that the Soviets truly wanted the US to believe that there was none.
During his extensive interviews, Nosenko was asked simple questions: what elevator did you take to your floor, how were secretaries assigned,what is your KGB rank, what did they serve in the lunch room and other seemingly mundane quesions? He could not provide answers. I can still remember the layout of each office that I occupied and that was over 30 years ago. Nosenko was poorly briefed. The KGB hoped that we would focus on the things that they wanted us to know not the trivia that would make or break Nosenko's bona fides. Nobody is perfect.
It is the simple things that trip you up when you lie.
One thing that Mr. Bagely missed when he talked about other, non-Soviet, operations was that during the deception operation being run against the Germans in WW 2 leading up to the Normandy landings, the Brits dropped agents into occupied France that they knew would be captured and tortured. They had been given scraps of information that conformed to what the German high command wanted to believe: the invasion would be north of the Seine near Calais. That, gentle reader, is cold. So, it is no great reach to suspect the Soviets from doing the same kind of thing.
One way to deal with this would be to have aspiring CIA officers listen to a debate on the Nosenko issue, having both sides make presentations and then let the little darlings think for themselves. That is what we pay them to do, after all: THINK.
Superspy
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